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Abstract
Do variations in labor market institutions affect the cross-border organization of the firm?
Using firm-level data on multinationals located in France, we show that firms are more likely
to outsource the production of intermediate inputs to external suppliers when importing from
countries with high worker bargaining power. This effect is stronger for firms operating in
capital-intensive and differentiated industries. We propose a theoretical mechanism that ratio-
nalizes these findings. The fragmentation of the value chain weakens the workers’ bargaining
position, by limiting the amount of revenues that are subject to union extraction. The outsourc-
ing strategy reduces the share of surplus that is appropriated by the union, which enhances the
firm’s incentives to invest. Since investment creates relatively more value in capital-intensive
industries, increases in worker bargaining power are more likely to be conducive to outsourcing
in those industries. Overall, our findings suggest that global firms choose their organizational
structure strategically when sourcing intermediate inputs from markets where worker bargain-
ing power is high.
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1 Introduction
The globalization process is characterized by increasing international specialization of production and the
organization of firms’ activities on a global scale. Around one-third of total trade takes place within
multinational firms’ boundaries, with developed countries posting an even larger proportion. Furthermore,
trade in intermediate inputs has risen steadily in recent decades to become a key feature of the current
international trade structure (Hummels et al., 2001). In this context, the study of global production
networks naturally attracted a great deal of attention.
In this paper we ask how the cross-border organization of firms is affected by bargaining in the labor
market. We are interested in the way the bargaining power of workers in host countries affects sourcing
decisions by multinational firms. We present an empirical analysis based on a unique firm-level dataset on
the sourcing modes of multinationals located in France. An important feature of these data is that they
provide the proportion of intra-firm imports for each firm, seller-industry, and country-of-origin triplet. We
use an index developed in Botero et al. (2004) that captures the power of workers by means of the extent
to which industrial action is allowed by the law. Our results show that the bargaining power of workers
in origin countries has a negative effect on the share of intra-firm imports. The effect is sizeable. The
average share of intra-firm imports in the sample is 28%. Take the countries with the highest (Italy) and
lowest (Denmark) index value.1 If Italy’s labor market institutions were equal to Denmark’s, the average
intra-firm exports to France would increase by 7.6%. This figure rises to 12.8% when we run the regression
on OECD countries alone.
Our results hold using more traditional measures of bargaining power such as union coverage, and they
are robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls that have been shown to determine intra-firm trade
shares. We also present within-country evidence based on the variation in unionization rates across US
industries. Our estimations indicate that the negative correlation between the share of intra-firm imports
and worker bargaining power increases with capital intensity, but only in the case of industries for which
relationship-specific investments are substantial (“relationship-specific” industries), and thus for which the
hold-up problem is relatively more important. We identify the relationship-specific industries in our data
using the Rauch (1999) classification of commodities, following a strategy similar to that of Nunn (2007).
We motivate our empirical analysis with a simple model of outsourcing under incomplete contracts,
to which we introduce labor market bargaining. In an upstream stage of production, an intermediate
good is manufactured by workers, who bargain collectively on wages and employment. Downstream, the
intermediate good is transformed into a final good by means of the firms’ capital stock. The organizational
decision is whether to keep the production of the component within the firm’s boundaries or to outsource
it to an independent supplier. A key assumption of the model is that, when operating an integrated
facility, the final-good producer bargains with the union over the sharing of total profits. Conversely, when
production of the component is outsourced, the supplier and the workers bargain over the profits of the
subcontractor. Through this mechanism, outsourcing weakens the union’s bargaining position. However,
when subcontracting, the firm faces a risk of opportunistic behavior from the supplier. When union
bargaining power is above a certain cutoff, the cost of running an integrated plant in terms of rent-sharing
is large, and subcontracting is chosen. This cutoff value depends on the capital intensity of the production
process. With specific capital, the firm faces a potential hold-up problem from the union (Grout, 1984).
Outsourcing reduces exposure to ex-post worker opportunism because, in the bargain with the workers, the
1See Hummels et al. (2014) for a discussion on the flexibility of the Danish labor market.
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outside option for the supplier is greater than that of the final-good producer when he runs an integrated
plant. Under plausible parameter configurations, the cutoff increases with capital intensity. Hence, worker
bargaining power is more conducive to outsourcing in capital-intensive industries.
The theoretical results are robust to considering alternative contracting and bargaining assumptions:
adopting a production function with an investment to produce the intermediate good, allowing for ex-ante
lump-sum transfers in outsourcing contracts, and reversing the sequence of bargains. We also discuss how
our theory can shed light on the relationship between firm scope and wages.
Our baseline theoretical model focuses on the integration decision of an individual producer. We
derive theoretical results for intra-firm trade shares from a multi-country version of the model, using the
framework developed in Antra`s (2014a). From this exercise, we obtain empirical predictions linking firm-
level intra-firm import shares by country to empirical measures of worker bargaining power at the origin
country-level, which are the subject of our empirical analysis.
One important assumption of our model is that of international rent-sharing within multinational firms.
A group of empirical studies provide evidence supporting this hypothesis, by showing that wages paid by
foreign affiliates are positively affected by the profits of their parent firms (e.g., Budd et al., 2005; Martins
and Yang, forthcoming).2
Our work contributes to two important strands of the international trade literature. One is the work on
collective bargaining and firms’ internationalization strategies. Most of the existing work is theoretical and
focuses on the incentives that unionization in domestic economies provides for firms to become horizontal
multinationals (e.g., Zhao, 1995). A smaller group of papers studies the case of intermediate input sourcing.
Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) neatly show that domestic unionization can generate incentives for firms to
engage in vertical FDI. Skaksen (2004) finds that the threat of outsourcing to low-wage countries reduces
homes wages, while realized outsourcing increases them (see also Lommerud et al., 2009). None of these
works studies the vertical integration versus outsourcing decision. Furthermore, while the focus has been
on workers in different countries producing for the same firm, we offer an explanation based on outsourcing
used to reduce the share of revenues available for union extraction. Our model shares with Zhao (2001)
the idea that the driver for vertical fragmentation is that the cost of bargaining breakdown is higher for
the integrated firm. We extend this idea in different ways, and within a different setup. In our model,
fragmentation arises when the bargaining power of workers is above a threshold. This generalization allows
taking the theoretical implications to the data, where we use measures of worker bargaining power across
countries (and industries in the case of imports from the US). The incomplete contract setting allows us
to study the role of investment and to derive implications based on the capital intensity of the production
technology.
Our results also contribute to a now well-developed scholarship on the theoretical and empirical deter-
minants of intra-firm trade, built around the seminal work of Antra`s (2003) and summarized in Antra`s
(2014a,b). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to study role of worker bargaining
power in shaping multinational firms’ boundaries. We show empirically that labor market institutions
are a strong determinant of intra-firm trade shares, with effects comparable to those of contracting and
financial institutions. We also introduce the idea that labor market imperfections generate a source of
2Martins and Yang, forthcoming, use panel data for MNE-affiliate pairs in 47 countries. They find the effect to be
increasing in the differences in per capita GDP across the locations of multinationals and their affiliates, consistently with
rent-sharing occurring along vertical supply chains. Budd et al. (2005, p.1) mention the experience of the steel maker Corus
that, in 2002, could face industrial action for freezing wages in the UK while increasing them in the Netherlands. The UK
union stated “We all work for the same company, and we should all get the same deal.”
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contractual incompleteness, additional to the contractual frictions between firms and their foreign suppli-
ers that have been studied thus far. Our empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that, without the
possibility of integrating their workers, firms tend to rely on external suppliers to alleviate this alternative
hold-up problem. One contribution of our paper is to bridge the two strands of the literature mentioned
in the preceeding paragraphs into one integrated analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and discusses
the robustness analysis. Section 3 develops a multi-country model and presents the empirical predictions.
Section 4 describes the estimating datasets and presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
We now develop a simple model of firm boundaries featuring labor market bargaining. We begin by studying
firm behavior for a given demand. We describe the general equilibrium of the model in Section 3.1 below,
where we analyze the implications for the share of intra-firm trade in a multi-country world.
2.1 Set-up
Three agents participate in production: a final-good producer (F), a manufacturer of intermediate goods
(M), and a labor union (U).
Technology and Demand
F owns the technology to produce a final good with demand y = Ap−1/(1−α), where and A is a shifter and
α ∈ (0, 1) governs the price elasticity. This demand schedule can be derived from consumer preferences
that feature constant elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties, as we do in Section 3.1.
Production requires the combination of two inputs: one investment in capital, k, and one intermediate
good, m. Technology is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
y(k,m) =
(
k
β
)β (
m
1− β
)(1−β)
(1)
For simplicity, we assume that one unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of the intermediate good:
m = l. Revenues are:
R(k, l) = A1−α
(
k
β
)βα(
l
1− β
)(1−β)α
(2)
Organization of Production
The final-good producer controls the provision of capital (which he rents at a fixed rate r). He decides on
the organizational form under which production occurs from the following two alternatives:
1. Vertical Integration. F hires labor and employs M as the manager of the upstream division in
charge of producing the intermediate good. F undertakes investments and combines capital with the
intermediate good to produce and market the final good.
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2. Outsourcing. F outsources the production of the intermediate good to M, who becomes an indepen-
dent subcontractor. M hires labor, produces the intermediate good and trades it to F, who undertakes
investments and combines capital with the intermediate good to produce and market the final good.
The organizational decision dictates whether M is an internal employee or an unaffiliated subcontrac-
tor, and thus whether F keeps or not the production of the intermediate good within firm boundaries.
Importantly, the decision determines who hires the necessary labor in the labor market. We assume that
F chooses the organizational form that provides him with the highest payoff.
There are two types of contractual relationships. One type is that of labor contracts, which govern
employment relationships of union members (and are signed either between U and F or between U and
M, depending on organizational choice). The other type is that of sourcing contracts, which govern the
terms over which F and M trade the intermediate good. We now outline the contracting and bargaining
assumptions that define employment and sourcing relationships. We start with the labor contract.
The Employment Relationship: Contracting and Bargaining Assumptions
A labor union U is composed of a continuum of workers L. Union members are homogenous in productivity
and are each endowed with one unit of labor. U is the only supplier of labor available to F or M. Unemployed
individuals obtain the reservation wage ω.
Production of the intermediate good requires an agreement with U that takes the form of a “labor
contract.” The labor contract specifies the individual wage and the level of employment. Wages and
employment are bargained simultaneously following the efficient bargaining model of McDonald and Solow
(1981) and using the generalized Nash Bargaining solution. Bargaining happens at the firm-level.
We assume that labor contracts are incomplete: no aspect of the employment relationship is assumed to
be contractible ex-ante. Ex-ante agreements do not bind the union to providing the agreed quantity of labor
at the agreed wage rate: at any time before production, it can call for renegotiation. The terms of the labor
contract, which include both wages and the choice of labor, are determined through ex-post bargaining,
once investments costs have been committed. Ex-post agreements are assumed to be binding. Importantly,
the contractual environment governing the labor contract is identical whether the organizational choice
is vertical integration or outsourcing. The difference is that under vertical integration F bargains with U
whereas under outsourcing it is M that bargains with U, which has consequences for determining the joint
surplus that is bargained over.
The incompleteness of labor contracts and the hold-up problem associated with employment relation-
ships are at the center of a large literature (see e.g., Cahuc et al., 2014). We do not model the reasons
for such contract incompleteness. We take it as a relevant feature of the reality of industrial relations and
study its implications for firm scope.
The Sourcing Relationship: Contracting and Bargaining Assumptions
Under outsourcing, M is the manager of an unaffiliated subcontracting firm. An outsourcing contract
governs the terms of trade between F and M. In keeping with the recent literature, we assume that
outsourcing contracts are incomplete: no aspect is contractible ex-ante. We make the usual assumption
that the relevant features of production (e.g., quality or customization) are perfectly observable for the
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parties in the relationship, but unverifiable by outside agents such as courts or mediators. The contractual
environment we consider is close to what Antra`s (2014a) labels “totally incomplete” contracts, with the
difference being that he allows for ex-ante lump-sum transfers to be contracted upon. As with the case of
labor contracts, we take contract incompleteness as a fact of the reality of outsourcing without modeling
the reasons why binding contracts are unfeasible. The impossibility to write ex-ante enforceable contracts
leads F and M to renegotiate the terms of trade through ex-post bargaining, after capital has been installed
and the intermediate good has been produced. We model this ex-post bargaining with the generalized Nash
Bargaining solution and assuming symmetric information at that stage. Ex-post agreements are assumed
to be binding.
The case of vertical integration is assumed to be rather different. When F keeps the production of
the intermediate good within firm boundaries, he enjoys full authority over M’s actions. The consequence
is that, at any time, M complies with all of the features that have been specified in an initial (ex-ante)
contract, thus eliminating the need for ex-post renegotiation. Furthermore, F’s power allows him to de-
mand an ex-ante lump-sum transfer from M that he uses to extract all the surplus accruing to the latter.
Importantly, the effectiveness of F’s authority in disciplining M under vertical integration holds irrespec-
tively of the contracting environment governing outsourcing. These assumptions capture the spirit of the
“transaction-cost” approach to firm boundaries (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985).3 They are, admittedly,
strong assumptions, and they create an asymmetry with the outsourcing case. However, they allow us to
succinctly capture the role of labor market bargaining in generating a trade-off between integration and
outsourcing. As will become clear, our model highlights a cost of running vertically integrated firms that
arises when labor is unionized. We refrain from imposing “governance costs” under integration (which is
usual in transaction-cost models to generate a non-trivial trade-off between the cost of running firms and
the cost of market transactions) since they would not alter the nature of any of the subsequent results.
Specificity and Lock-in Effects
We now describe the assumptions that determine the outside option for each party under each organi-
zational form. We assume that both k and m are fully “relationship-specific.” Both inputs need to be
fully-tailored to the unique requirements of the variety produced by F and, once they have been produced,
they are useless outside the relationship. We further assume that, when F bargains with M, it would
be prohibitively costly for him to turn to alternative suppliers in case an agreement is not reached. For
simplicity, we normalize to 0 the income that both agents might derive from other activities. These as-
sumptions have important consequences. In an outsourcing partnership, once investment costs have been
committed, F and M become “locked-in” with each other and the situation is one of bilateral monopoly.
In light of the contract incompleteness plaguing the outsourcing relationship, a (double-sided) “hold-up”
problem arises. In labor market bargaining, specificity implies that F has an outside option of 0 during the
ex-post bargaining with U. Labor is homogenous, and all individuals are entitled to the reservation wage
ω at any point in time. Workers do not undertake specific investments, and this asymmetry is a source of
bargaining power for the union (the hold-up problem is one-sided).
For future record, we now recap the main contracting assumptions that define our baseline environment:
• A1: Labor contracts are incomplete: no aspect of the employment relationship is contractible ex-ante.
3Antra`s (2014a) reviews the applications of this theory of the firm to settings similar to ours. A pedagogical example is
provided in Antra`s and Yeaple (2014).
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• A2: Outsourcing contracts are incomplete: no aspect of the commercial relationship between F and
M is contractible ex-ante.
• A3: k and m are fully-specific to the particular variety produced by F and have 0 value for other
producers. Furthermore, if the ex-post bargaining with M breaks down, F cannot turn to alternative
suppliers of m.
In Section 2.3 we discuss the results obtained in more general environments.
Timing
The timing of events is the following. At the initial date t = 0, F chooses the organizational structure
from the two alternatives introduced above. During the same period, he approaches M and proposes her
an initial contract that specifies whether she becomes an employee or the manager of an independent
subcontractor. The following period, t = 1, is an investment stage where F invests in capital. Importantly,
k is sunk from this moment onwards. Next, at period t = 2, wages and employment are bargained with
the labor union U. If vertical integration was chosen at t = 0, the bargaining party is F. Otherwise, if
outsourcing was selected, M bargains with U as the head of the independent subcontracting firm. After
an agreement with U is reached, the intermediate good is produced. This is followed by stage t = 3, where
F and M renegotiate their initial contract, engaging in a bargaining process over the terms of trade of the
intermediate good. Given the above assumptions, such renegotiation takes place under outsourcing but not
under vertical integration. Finally, at t = 4, the terms of either the initial or the renegotiated contract are
executed, depending on organizational form. Capital and the intermediate good are combined to produce
the final good, which is then sold to final consumers.
We assume that all three agents have perfect information on all the parameters of the model, and that
they perfectly forecast future payoffs associated with any actions taken.
Benchmark: Efficient Production
Before proceeding to the solution of the model, let us first define a benchmark of “productive efficiency,” as
a situation where factor demands are determined by the equality of each factor’s marginal revenue product
and its competitive price. The efficient pair (kE , lE) is determined by the following conditions (the full
expressions are provided in the Appendix):
∂R
∂k
= r
∂R
∂l
= ω (3)
Sales revenues evaluated at (kE , lE) are:
RE = Aα
α
1−α
(
rβω1−β
) −α
1−α (4)
2.2 Solution
We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model by using backward induction. We refer to
expressions related to vertical integration and outsourcing using subscripts v and o, respectively.
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Vertical Integration
At t = 4, revenues R(kv, lv) are generated. Given that M’s actions are disciplined by F’s authority, there
is no renegotiation of the initial sourcing contract at t = 3. Such an initial contract includes a lump-sum
transfer from M to F that results in the latter getting all sales revenues. At t = 2, F and U bargain on
wages and the level of employment. The incompleteness of labor contracts (A1) leads parties to bargain
ex-post, after F has invested in capital. During the negotiations both agents have the capacity to stop
production: in such an event, joint revenues are 0. Consider the net gain each party gets from production
(defined as the payoff from agreement net of the own outside option), starting with F. Capital has been
sunk at t = 1 and it is assumed to be fully-specific and to have no value for other producers (A3). If U
refuses to provide labor, F is left with a capital stock that he cannot resell or combine with other labor.
Hence, the outside option for F is 0. In case production occurs, he obtains sales revenues net of labor
costs, but gross of investment costs: R(kv, lv) − wvlv. Turning to U, every union member can obtain ω
elsewhere: the outside option for the union is ωL. We assume that the objective of U is to maximize
the “union rent,” defined as the membership’s aggregate income gains from employment, over and above
the income that each member obtains in the event of no employment. U’s net gain from production is
U(wv, lv) = (wv − ω)lv.4
As mentioned in the previous subsection, we model labor market bargaining using the efficient bar-
gaining model of McDonald and Solow (1981) and assuming it is represented by the generalized Nash
Bargaining solution. We denote λ the parameter representing the bargaining power of F. We think of λ as
determined by the laws and regulations affecting the relative power of firms and workers during collective
negotiations.
The bargaining problem is written as:
max
wv,lv
Ωv = [R(kv, lv)− wvlv]λ [(wv − ω) lv]1−λ (5)
Subject to 0 ≤ l ≤ L and w ≥ ω. The first-order conditions (FOCs) can be rearranged to give:
wv = (1− λ)R(kv, lv)
lv
+ λω
∂R
∂l
= ω (6)
The first expression shows that bargained wages wv are a weighted sum of revenues per worker and
the reservation wage, with weights equal to the bargaining power of workers and the final-good producer,
respectively. The higher λ, the smaller the extent of rent-sharing. The second expression shows that
employment is determined by the equality of the marginal revenue product of labor and ω: for a given
value of the capital stock kv, labor is used efficiently irrespectively of λ. With all bargaining power on F’s
side (λ = 1) we have w = ω. Generally, with 0 < λ < 1 the solution entails w > ω which implies that the
union obtains positive rents.5
At the investment stage t = 1, F chooses the level of capital to maximize his payoff piv = R(kv, lv) −
wvlv − rkv, anticipating the outcome of the negotiations with U. Using the expressions derived above the
4This formulation of the objective function is consistent with the union being utilitarian and composed of risk-neutral
workers (thus seeking to maximize the sum of the individual members’ income, see Cahuc et al., 2014). It can also be obtained
with the Stone-Geary utility function and assuming the union values wages and employment equally.
5The result that labor is chosen efficiently follows from the assumption of a rent-maximizing union. The solution presented
here is labeled “strongly efficient” in the literature because it entails both “productive efficiency” (conditional on the level of
capital) and “Pareto efficiency”(Cahuc et al., 2014).
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problem is written as:
max
kv
piv = λR(kv, lv) − λlvω − rkv (7)
With FOC: ∂R∂k =
r
λ . Thus, λ influences the choice of kv: it is a consequence of the combined effect
of assumptions A1 and A3, and the associated hold-up problem. (λ affects the equilibrium value of lv
indirectly through its effect on kv.)
The expressions in (6) and the FOC of (7) form a system of equations, the solution of which gives
equilibrium values for (kv, lv, wv) (see the Appendix). Replacing into (2) and (7) we obtain equilibrium
revenues and profits under vertical integration:
Rv = Aα
α
1−α
(( r
λ
)β
ω1−β
) −α
1−α
piv = λ(1− α)Aα α1−α
(( r
λ
)β
ω1−β
) −α
1−α
(8)
The parameter λ appears twice in piv, highlighting two effects of wage bargaining on profits. One
is a pure rent-sharing effect: the bargaining process leaves F with a share λ of the ex-post gains from
production. The second is an efficiency effect: the incompleteness of the labor contract coupled with the
full-specificity of capital leads to a hold-up problem that distorts ex-ante incentives to invest, reducing
total revenues. The lower λ, the stronger the distortion. The choices of (kv, lv) and the resulting Rv are
identical to those that would be obtained in a frictionless setting with a rental rate of capital of rλ , as a
comparison of the FOC of (7) with (3) reveals. In his seminal contribution, Grout (1984) called 1λ the
“implicit cost of capital.” Naturally, the lower λ, the higher this implicit cost is and the lower the level
of kv. In comparison with those that would be obtained in a frictionless environment as defined by (4),
revenues are reduced by a factor λ
βα
1−α < 1.6
The following Lemma establishes formally how piv is affected by changes in λ:
Lemma 1 F’s payoff under vertical integration, piv, satisfies
∂piv
∂λ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
F’s payoff is increasing in his bargaining power: higher λ leads F to reap a larger share of surplus and
boosts investment, leading to more efficient production and higher total revenues.
Outsourcing
We now turn to outsourcing. At t = 3, once ko and mo have been invested and are ready to be combined
to generate sales revenues R(ko,mo) at t = 4, F and M sit down to renegotiate a price for the intermediate
good. We model the negotiations using a generalized Nash Bargaining process, the outcome of which leaves
each party with the value of its outside option plus a share of the ex-post gains from trade. We assume
that F obtains a share φ and M a share (1 − φ) of the ex-post gains from trade. Consider the outside
options available to the parties, bearing in mind the assumption of full-specificity of k and m (A3). At
the time bargaining takes place, M has already produced the intermediate good (paying the cost wolo to
remunerate the labor union). In case an agreement with F is not reached, she will be left with a component
that she cannot resale to other producers, and thus with a payoff of 0. Similarly, F has invested in ko. He
6In fact, our model under vertical integration is a special case of the Grout (1984) model, which is based on generic profit
functions and that did not consider the possibility to outsource. Grout assumed capital had a positive resale value but lower
than its purchase price. By assuming fully-specific capital, we are setting the resale value of k to zero.
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does not have time to turn to other potential suppliers or obtain any income from selling the capital stock
to other final-good producers. Hence, both parties have an outside option of 0. Under these assumptions,
the bargaining process leaves F with a payoff of φR(ko,mo) and M with a payoff of (1− φ)R(ko,mo).
At t = 2, M engages in negotiations with U to secure the labor required for the production of the inter-
mediate good. The assumptions framing the bargaining process are exactly the same as those of the case of
vertical integration. The only difference is that now it is M who bargains with U, following the assumption
of the firm-level labor market bargaining. Hence, finding the bargaining outcome requires solving a problem
similar to (5) but adjusting the payoffs accordingly.7 What M stands to gain from production is the income
derived from selling the intermediate good to F, net of labor costs: (1−φ)R(ko, lo)−wolo. In the event of
a negotiation breakdown, M is unable to produce the intermediate good and keeps his outside income that
has been normalized to 0. The union’s objective is to maximize the union rent: U(wo, lo) = (wo − ω)lo.
FOCs are:
wo = (1− λ)(1− φ)R(ko, lo)
lo
+ λω
∂R
∂l
=
ω
(1− φ) (9)
At the investment stage t = 1, F chooses the level of capital to maximize his payoff piv = R(ko, lo) −
wolo − rko. The problem is written as:
max
ko
pio = φR(ko, lo)− rko (10)
with FOC ∂R∂k =
r
φ . Two main differences with the vertical integration case stand out. First, wages are
a weighted sum of the reservation wage and the suppliers’ per-worker revenues. Second, ex-ante incentives
to invest are different. Factor demands are determined by the share of ex-post gains obtained by F and M
in the negotiation occurring at t = 3.
Using ∂R∂k =
r
φ together with (9) we can solve for the equilibrium values of (ko, lo, wo) (provided in the
Appendix). We obtain total revenues and F’s equilibrium payoff under outsourcing pio:
Ro = Aα
α
1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1− φ
)1−β) −α1−α
pio = φ(1− βα)Aα α1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1− φ
)1−β) −α1−α
(11)
Inefficiencies arise from the hold-up problem affecting the outsourcing relationship, as it is apparent
from the revenue function Ro in (11). The effect of contract incompleteness is analogous to an increase
in factor costs, of 1φ and
1
1−φ for k and l, respectively. Compared to those that would be obtained in a
frictionless environment as defined by (4), revenues are reduced by a factor [φβ(1− φ)1−β ] α1−α < 1. Given
that M does not undertake any ex-ante investments in specific capital, and that labor is chosen efficiently,
the incompleteness of labor contracts has no bearing in optimal investments and revenues. λ plays a pure
redistributive role between M and U. M’s payoff is:
7λ is thought to be determined by the institutions determining the division of rents between firms and workers. One could
adapt the model to understand λ as the equilibrium share obtained by firms when negotiating with workers. It could be
justified on the grounds that some firms can shift production across plants, having an outside option. This feature has been
extensively studied (e.g., Zhao, 1995), and we prefer to abstract from it and focus on the novel implications of our model.
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piMo = λ(1− φ)(1− (1− β)α)Aα
α
1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1− φ
)1−β) −α1−α
(12)
Inspection of (11) shows that pio is unaffected by λ.
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Worker Bargaining Power and Firm Boundaries
Roll now the clock back to t = 0. At this point in time, F makes organizational choices by comparing
the payoffs which he perfectly anticipates that each strategy provides. Vertical integration will be chosen
whenever Γ ≡ pivpio > 1. Using (8) and (11):
Γ(λ, β, φ, α) =
λ
1−(1−β)α
1−α (1− α)
φ(1− βα)
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
) α
1−α
(13)
Expression (13) depends on all the parameters of the model, but we are particularly interested in how
the bargaining power of workers in industrial relations shapes the optimal boundaries of the firm. Solving
for the value of λ for which Γ > 1, we find:
λ∗(β, φ, α) ≡
φ(1− βα)
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
) α
1−α
(1− α)

1−α
1−(1−β)α
(14)
The following Proposition establishes formally how F’s organizational choices depend on λ:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique cutoff λ∗(β, φ, α) ∈ (0, 1) such that: for λ > λ∗(β, φ, α) the final-
good producer chooses to setup a vertically integrated plant, for λ < λ∗(β, φ, α) he chooses to outsource the
intermediate good, and for λ = λ∗(β, φ, α) he is indifferent between the two organizational forms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 provides the main result of the theoretical analysis: empowering workers increases the
profitability of outsourcing over vertical integration. When λ is high, the optimal organizational form is
that of vertical integration. Decreases in λ imply that F gives away a larger share of ex-post revenues to
U which, given our contracting and bargaining assumptions, also distorts his ex-ante incentives to invest,
and further reduces piv (see Lemma 1). By subcontracting, the final-good producer avoids the bargain with
U, with the result that pio is independent of λ. For values of λ sufficiently low, outsourcing becomes the
preferred organizational form.9
A comparative static analysis on the cutoff λ∗(β, φ, α) leads to the following result:
Proposition 2 The cutoff λ∗(β, φ, α) is increasing in β for φ > 1 − e−b(β,α), decreasing in β for φ <
1 − e−b(β,α), and independent of β for φ = 1 − e−b(β,α), with b(α, β) = (1 − α)
[
1−α+βα
1−βα + ln
(
1−βα
1−α
)]
Proof. See the Appendix.
8In the robustness analysis of Section 2.3 we discuss two extensions in which pio becomes a function of λ: considering a
production function with a specific investment by M, and allowing for ex-ante transfers between F and M under outsourcing.
The results of the baseline model carry through. (The full details are provided in the Online Appendix.).
9One important feature of the solution is that λ∗(β, φ, α) does not depend on (ω, r). Given the Cobb-Douglas production
function and the demand system we consider, factor prices do not impact the ratio piv/pio.
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The impact of worker bargaining power on the organizational choice depends on the capital intensity of
the production technology. Proposition 2 provides the second important result arising from the model. It
states that, under certain parameter configurations that we will argue below are plausible, outsourcing is
more likely when the technology is capital-intensive and the power of firms in the bargaining with workers
is weak: the higher β, the higher λ∗(β, φ, α), and thus the larger the range of λ for which piv < pio.
The intuition behind the results of Proposition 2 is the following. As capital becomes more important,
underinvestment in k becomes more value-reducing, and F’s payoff under vertical integration is lower for
all values of λ. Under outsourcing, revenues are increasing in capital intensity when the share obtained by
F in the ex-post bargaining is large, because F is the party in charge of the capital investments. Therefore,
for large enough values of φ, increases in capital intensity reduce the ratio piv/pio for all λ, leading to a
higher λ∗(β, φ, α).10
Figure 1 plots the contours implicitly defined by φ = 1 − e−b(β,α) in the (α, β) space, using different
values for φ. Points above each line give those pairs (α, β) for which φ > 1− e−b(β,α).
Figure 1: The effect of capital intensity under different parameter configurations
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The main message of Figure 1 is that the condition φ > 1 − e−b(β,α) is likely to hold under plausible
parameter values. To see this point, note that α is likely to be in the range (0.5, 1). Those are realistic
values if α = 1− 1/σ, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties (see Section
2.4 below). The median estimate of σ in Broda and Weinstein (2006) is close to 4. Similarly, it is reasonable
to consider cases with β < 0.5.11 For those parameter ranges the condition is always met for φ = 0.5, and
it is quite likely to hold for lower values of φ. Empirical estimates of φ are scarce. Feenstra and Hanson
(2005) report a value of φ = 0.5, estimated using data on foreign firms operating in China (their estimate
is of φ = 0.7, but not statistically different from 0.5 at conventional levels).
This completes the analysis of the baseline model. Let us remark here that the results of Proposition
2 hinge on the assumption that capital investment is relationship-specific and has no outside value (A3),
which leads to a hold-up problem because contracts are incomplete (A1 and A2). Without this hold-up
10In the Online Appendix we study how piv and pio are affected by β.
11For example, Fally (2012) uses US input-output tables from the BEA and finds that the total share of intermediate goods
in US production is around 0.5, implying a value of β below 0.5.
12
problem, the effect of λ on organizational choices is independent of β. In the empirical analysis we account
for relationship-specificity when we study the effect of capital intensity on organizational choices.
2.3 Extensions and robustness analysis
In this section we discuss the robustness of the results to a set of alternative technological, contracting,
and bargaining assumptions. The details of the derivations are provided in the Online Appendix.
Introducing a specific investment to produce the intermediate good
Imagine that production of the intermediate good requires M to undertake an investment in relationship-
specific capital km, according to the following technology: m(km, l) =
(
km
ξ
)ξ (
l
1−ξ
)1−ξ
with 0 < ξ < 1.
Call kf the investment by F. In this setting, and as before, outsourcing allows for avoiding the deterring
effects of labor contract incompleteness on the choice of kf . However, km is subject to labor opportunism
to the same extent under both organizations. Revenues are reduced by the same proportion by the
underinvestment in km. Hence, the ratio
piv
pio
is the same as in (13) and thus Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
Allowing for ex-ante transfers in outsourcing contracts
Assume the outsourcing contract allows for enforceable ex-ante lump-sum transfers between F and M, as
in Antra`s (2003) and related works. No other aspect of the outsourcing relationship is ex-ante contractible.
The transfer occurs at t = 0, before the investment and bargaining stages. The structure of the game in
periods t = 1 to t = 4 is identical to that of the baseline model.
We focus on the case with an unbounded pool of potential agents M that are willing to supply the
intermediate good and obtain an income equal to their outside opportunity (which has been normalized
to zero). F picks one of such agents and makes her a take-it-or-leave-it offer, in which the transfer is set
to extract the entire ex-post surplus (i.e. making the participation constraint of the supplier bind). The
transfer is non-distortionary, hence all subsequent actions are unchanged.
F’s payoff under vertical integration is given as before by piv in (8). Ex-post payoffs for F and M
under outsourcing are given in (11) and (12), respectively, and thus F’s expected payoff from outsourcing
is piTo = pio + pi
M
o . Importantly, pi
T
o is an increasing function of λ, because λ affects the surplus obtained
by the supplier in labor market bargaining (see the expression for piMo ). Under this alternative contracting
setting, F chooses the organizational form that maximizes total corporate profits, net of labor costs (instead
of his own ex-post payoff). The two main results of Section 2.2 carry on: there is a unique value λ∗(β, φ, α)
determining organizational choices, and this value is increasing in β for large enough values of φ.
Input price bargained before wages under outsourcing
We now discuss the case of an inverse sequence of bargains under outsourcing. At the beginning of period
t = 2, F and M bargain over a payment P to which M is entitled if she produces the intermediate good and
trades it to F. Such bargaining happens right before M bargains with U (and thus before production of
the intermediate good), but after F has invested in k. Importantly, there is no renegotiation of P at a later
stage.12 For comparability with our baseline environment we model this negotiation with a generalized
12This can result if the payment P occurs at the same period in which M hands the intermediate good to F. Note that
enforcing P would require information on sales revenues and employment, but not on specific investments.
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Nash bargaining process where F’s bargaining power is φ and M’s is (1 − φ). In the bargain over P both
agents anticipate the outcome of the future negotiation with U, which implies that M’s net gains from
trade with F equal P − wolo.
There are two important changes. One is that the possibility of committing on P before production
of m naturally eliminates the hold-up problem affecting the choice of labor. The other one is that the
bargaining problem between F and M internalizes the cost of ensuring the workers’ participation in pro-
duction. Compared to the baseline model, F’s ex-ante payoff is lower and M’s is higher (for given levels
of investments). Other than this, λ continues to play a redistributive role affecting the division of surplus
between M and U.
These changes notwithstanding, there exists a unique cutoff λ∗(β, φ, α) ∈ (0, 1) determining the orga-
nizational choice, and it behaves qualitatively with respect to β in the same manner as in the baseline
model.
Firm scope and wages
Outsourcing has often been cited as a strategy aimed at reducing wages in unionized firms. A simple
extension of our framework can shed light on the impact of fragmentation on individual wages. The
functional forms for technology and demand that we use imply that employment adjusts to organizational
changes in a way such that individual wages remain the same: wv = wo irrespective of λ (see the paper’s
Appendix for the detailed expressions). The insensitivity of wages to changes in a revenue shifter under
these functional forms is well-known in the labor economics literature (e.g., McDonald and Solow, 1981).
A mild modification of our model generates individual wages that vary with organizational choices.
Assume that production of m requires a fixed cost in terms of non-relationship-specific capital f . It can
be thought of as non-specialized equipment that can be setup right before production and has a resale
value equal to its cost. Given non-specificity, the costs of f are shared between the labor union and the
corresponding bargaining agent (F or M).
Importantly, under this new configuration, the revenues-to-employment ratio increases with revenues.
Outsourcing reduces the revenues that are bargained over with U, therefore reducing individual wages
as well. Thus, our model puts forward an “organizational channel,” to explain the relationship between
fragmentation and wages. As in the baseline model, there is a unique cutoff λ∗(β, φ, α) ∈ (0, 1) determining
the organizational choice, and it increases with β for values of φ above a certain threshold. An interesting
result that arises in this modified setting is that, in the neighborhood of λ∗, increasing union power
(decreasing λ) leads to a decrease in wages. We close by noting that, in the baseline model, similar
conclusions can be derived for union welfare.
3 Multi-Country Model and Empirical Implementation
In this section we derive the empirical implications of the model in terms of intra-firm trade shares at
the bilateral country-level, both for individual producers and at the aggregate level. The section provides
the transition for the empirical analysis carried out in Section 4 below, that relies on firm-level data on
intra-firm import shares by multinationals located in France.
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3.1 Multi-country model
We now embed the model into a simple version of the multi-country global sourcing model developed
in Antra`s (2014a) (based on Antra`s et al., 2014, and Tintelnot, 2014). Consider a world composed of
J countries and two sectors. One sector produces a homogeneous good y under constant returns to
scale, and the other one produces a continuum of slightly differentiated varieties of a generic good Q.
Consumers have the same preferences all over the world. They spend a share γ of their income in the
consumption of Q, having Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over the continuum of varieties. Demand for variety
x is q(x) = γEP
α
1−α p(x)
−1
1−α , where P is the ideal price index associated with Q, E is world income, and
α = 1− 1/σ where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. There is free
trade in final goods in both sectors.
Regarding the supply side, we assume for simplicity that there is a unique composite factor of produc-
tion, labor, which is supplied inelastically and freely mobile across sectors. Each country j is endowed with
Lj units of labor. The homogeneous good is assumed to be produced in all countries and in large quantities
(due to low γ) so that the reservation wage ωj is determined by labor productivity in that sector (thus
differences in labor productivity across countries generate differences in ωj). The good y serves as the
numeraire. These assumptions are standard in the theory of multinational firm boundaries (e.g., Antra`s
and Helpman, 2004) and allow us to treat factor prices as given.13
The market structure in the differentiated sector is that of monopolistic competition. In every country
i ∈ J there is a measure Ni of final-good producers (Fi) who own the prototype for developing a unique
variety x. Production requires combining capital k with one intermediate good m. Technology is given
by (1) but includes a Fi-specific “core productivity” parameter ϕ, which is Hicks-neutral (as in the Melitz
model). Each Fi is indexed by a unique value of ϕ, and the distribution of the ϕ
′s is identical in all
countries.14 The intermediate good can be sourced from any one of the J countries, and its production can
occur under vertical integration or outsourcing. Firm performance depends on two extra parameters. ahi
are the unit factor requirements to invest in k (or generally to customize it to be specific to variety x). It
is common to all firms located in country i. amjz is firm-specific and indexes the unit labor requirements
associated with the production of intermediate goods in country j under organization z, where z ∈ {V,O}
is an indicator variable for vertical integration (V) or outsourcing (O). amjz can be referred to as an
inverse measure of “sourcing productivity.” Importantly, sourcing productivity parameters are realizations
of a random variable (we provide details below). Shipping intermediate goods from j to i entails trade
costs of the iceberg-type equal to τij .
Using the demand function for x, together with the production technology, we can express the sales
revenues a firm headquartered in i obtains if sourcing m from country j under organizational form z:
Rijz(ϕ) = A
1−αϕα
(
k
ahiβ
)βα(
m
amjzτij(1− β)
)(1−β)α
(15)
with A = γEP
α
1−α . The profitability associated with sourcing m is specific to firms, source-countries
and organizational forms.
13Departing from this standard framework (for example by considering more than one production factor) would complicate
the analysis, leading us out of the scope of this section. Furthermore, the share of intra-firm trade at the country-level will
prove to be independent of factor prices, for similar reasons making the cutoff (14) in Section 2.2 independent of factor prices.
14We would obtain similar predictions in terms of intra-firm trade shares should we consider that entry is subject to fixed
costs and determined by a free-entry condition.
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The differentiated sector is unionized in all j ∈ J and labor market bargaining happens at the firm level.
Each firm attempting to produce in j bargains with a single labor union, with the bargaining power of firms
being governed by the parameter λj . Consider the case of a final-good producer Fi with headquarters in i
that decides to source from j. If Fi chooses vertical integration, he hires a local agent Mj as the manager
of the unit in j in charge of producing the intermediate good. Fi’s firm thus becomes a multinational firm
headquartered in i, and needs to agree with a labor union Uj to produce. Alternatively, he can propose
the local agent Mj an (international) outsourcing contract, in which case Mj is in charge of bargaining
with Uj as the head of an independent firm located in j. Fi and Mj bargain ex-post over the terms of
exchange and their bargaining powers are given respectively by φj and (1 − φj).15 Interactions between
Fi, Mj and Uj in each source country j take place after the realization of amjz, which is taken as given by
the three agents during the contracting and bargaining stages. Contracts are incomplete and k and m are
fully relationship-specific. Using the revenue function (15), it is easy to follow the steps of Section 2.2 to
obtain operating profits for a final-good producer with headquarters in country i, sourcing from country j
under organizational form z:
piijz(ϕ) = Aα
α
1−α
(
(ωiahi)
β(ωjamjzτij)
1−β) −α1−α ϕ α1−αΥijz (16)
Υijz summarizes the contractual frictions. It depends on the bargaining (λj , φj), technological (β), and
demand parameters (α) of the model (contrary to amjz, Υijz is not firm-specific). Υijz = 1 implies no
contractual distortion, but generally we have Υijz < 1.
There are fixed costs fijz to obtain a draw amjz. We follow Antra`s (2014a) and make the simplifying
assumption that fijV and fijO are small enough so that all final-good producers from every country i
find it optimal to incur them for every country j and organizational form z.16 While final-good producers
get draws for all countries, they only source from a single market in equilibrium because they only need
one intermediate good. The stochastic sourcing productivity parameter 1/amjz is drawn from a Fre´chet
distribution:
Pr(amjz ≥ a) = e−Tjaθ
With Tj > 0 and θ >
α(1−β)
1−α . Tj and θ have the same interpretation than in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Tj governs the location of the distribution (bigger values make high efficiency draws more likely). θ reflects
the variation within the distribution (lower values imply greater variability). We consider the simplest
case where these draws are independent across firms, locations, and organizational forms. Final-good
producers pick the j and z that maximize operating profits (16), which is equivalent to minimizing the
following expression: ωjamjzτijΥ
− 1−α
(1−β)α
ijz . Some Fi might decide to source from countries where workers
have high bargaining power (low λj , leading to low Υijz) if their sourcing productivity there is high - or
the other costs (ωj , τij) are low. Based on the properties of the Fre´chet, we can calculate the probability
that final-good producers in i will source intermediate goods from j under organizational form z:
15For symmetry we assume that the ex-post share obtained by Fi under outsourcing is a country-specific variable, like λj .
It could be argued that φ is firm- or sector-specific. In the empirical analysis we take an agnostic view and discuss how we
deal with the different possibilities.
16In a more general model the fixed costs would vary across countries and organizational forms. Antra`s et al. (2014) present
a model where productivity determines the set of countries where firms source from, but does not consider the internalization
decision. A theory of sorting into organizational forms according to productivity is provided in Antra`s and Helpman (2004),
and evidence in Corcos et al. (2013) and Defever and Toubal (2013).
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χijz =
Tj
(
ωjτijΥ
− 1−α
(1−β)α
ijz
)−θ
∑
l∈J
∑
z′∈{V,O} Tl
(
ωlτilΥ
− 1−α
(1−β)α
ilz′
)−θ (17)
Given that there is a continuum of final-good producers in each country, by the law of large num-
bers, (17) is also the share of intermediate goods that firms in i import from j under organization form
z.
The literature typically considers the share of intra-firm trade, defined as the ratio of the value of
intermediate goods imported within multinational firm boundaries to the total value of imports. Deriving
predictions in terms of this share requires us to take a stand on how intermediate goods are priced. We
follow Antra`s (2014a) and make the convenient assumption that prices are such that intermediate goods
account for the same multiple of operating profits irrespective of location and organization.17 In that case
the share of intra-firm trade in total imports is an (inverse) function of the contractual distortion of vertical
integration relative to that of outsourcing. For any importer country i and any exporter country j:
Sh intraij =
Γ
(1−α)θ
(1−β)α
ij
1 + Γ
(1−α)θ
(1−β)α
ij
(18)
where Γij =
ΥijV
ΥijO
, is the counterpart to (13). The intuitions governing the organizational choice of an
individual final-good producer smoothly carry on to the aggregate share. There exists a cutoff value λ∗j
such that Γij(λ
∗
j ) = 1. In such a case, the contractual distortions are equal for both organizations, and
Sh intraij = 1/2. (Organizational choices are made on the basis of the amjz’s.) The share of intra-firm
trade for any pair of countries (i, j) increases monotonically with λj ∈ (0, 1), taking values in the interval
(0,Γij |
(1−α)θ
(1−β)α
λj=1
/(1 + Γij |
(1−α)θ
(1−β)α
λj=1
)). A similar prediction arises from the extensions presented in Section 2.3, as
we show in the Online Appendix.
3.2 Empirical predictions and implementation
Our theoretical model delivers predictions relating the bargaining power of workers to the internalization
decision of individual global producers, highlighting heterogeneity according to the capital intensity of
the technology. Internalization decisions by firms located in France and importing from country c are
governed by the function Γic (and the corresponding versions derived in Section 2.3 that we provide in
the Online Appendix). Γic depends on the relative power of firms and workers in collective bargaining
at the country level (λc), the capital intensity of the buyer industry (βi(n)), its demand elasticity (αi(n)),
and the bargaining power of the final producer (φc). Let us write a stochastic version by adding an error
term µisc = θs + δi + isc. θs and δi are unobservable seller industry- and firm-specific effects, and isc is
assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean. Call Iisc a variable equal to 1 if firm i imports from seller industry s
from an affiliate in country c, and zero if it imports from an independent supplier. The theory predicts:
17In a complete-contract setting, input expenditures are a share (1 − β)α of revenues - see (4). In turn, revenues are a
multiple 1
1−α of operating profits, thus, input expenditure are a multiple
(1−β)α
1−α of operating profits.
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Iisc =
{
1 if Γ(λc, αi(n), βi(n), φc, isc)− 1 > 0
0 if Γ(λc, αi(n), βi(n), φc, isc)− 1 ≤ 0
(19)
In what follows we will use firm-level data to test the following empirical predictions:
Empirical Prediction 1 The likelihood of intra-firm imports at the firm - seller industry - exporting
country level is decreasing in the bargaining power of workers in the exporting country.
Empirical Prediction 2 In industries characterized by relationship-specific investments, the effect of
worker bargaining power on the likelihood of intra-firm imports should be stronger for capital-intensive
industries. For industries where investments have outside value (non-specific), there should be no such
differential effect.
Empirical Prediction 1 and Empirical Prediction 2 follow from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 re-
spectively (and from the equivalent Propositions discussed in Section 2.3 , and presented in the Online
Appendix.)
In practice we will estimate the following equation:
Iisc = γWBPc + ρXc + θs + δi + isc (20)
where the dependent variable Iisc is defined as the share of intra-firm imports from seller industry s
and country c by firm i. WBPc is the measure of the bargaining power of workers. Our theory predicts
a negative sign for γ: firms are expected to engage in less vertical integration and intra-firm trade when
offshoring in destinations where labor market regulations enhance workers’ bargaining power. Xc are
controls at the country level derived from previous literature.{θs, δi} are respectively a full set of seller
industry and firm dummies. (notice δi controls for the importer’s (buyer) industry affiliation.) isc is an
error term.
Equation (20) does not exactly correspond to equation (19). As discussed below, around 13% of the
observations in our data have 0 < Iisc < 1. These correspond to firms importing from the same seller
industry and country, but purchasing under both organizational forms. We choose to use Iisc as a share
in order not to lose information coming from these “mixed” observations.
Identification of γ comes from the variation in WBPc across countries. Our estimation equation in-
cludes a full set of firm- and seller industry-dummies. Firm dummies δi control for any individual firm
characteristics that are constant across seller industries and countries and might systematically affect sourc-
ing mode decisions (productivity, managerial preferences, etc.).18 They subsume the importer’s industry
affiliation, thereby controlling for αi(n) and βi(n), as well as any other relevant characteristics of buyer
industry. The inclusion of seller industry dummies θs holds constant any seller industry attributes (ob-
servable and unobservable) that might affect Iisc. Our empirical strategy accounts for these compositional
effects, exploiting within-firm changes in sourcing decisions across countries, with full controls for both
buyer and seller industry characteristics.
18Feenstra and Hanson (2005) suggest φ might be firm-specific, in which case δi holds φ constant. If it varies at the seller
industry-level (e.g., if inputs have varying degrees of relationship-specificity), θs control for it. If φ is determined by the
country’s institutions (e.g., FDI regulations) it is important to include a large number of institutional variables in X. Note
that if λc and φc are positively correlated that would work against us finding a significant effect of WBPc.
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4 Empirical Analysis
This Section is composed of two parts. In the first part we describe the different datasets used in the
implementation of the empirical analysis, providing further details in the Data Appendix. In the second
part we report the empirical results.
4.1 Data description
Firm-level data on global sourcing
Our main dataset is the Enquete Echanges Internationaux Intra-Groupe produced by the French Office
of Industrial Studies and Statistics (SESSI). It is based on a firm-level survey of manufacturing firms
belonging to groups with at least one affiliate in a foreign country, and with international transactions
totaling at least one million euro. The survey year is 1999.
The SESSI dataset provides, for each firm, details of all the international transactions carried out
in 1999, including the industry where the product was produced (henceforth “Seller industry”) and the
country of origin. Seller industries are classified at the 4-digit level of the harmonized system (HS4). The
survey provides the share of the value that was traded with affiliated firms versus independent firms. This
information is detailed for each triplet of importing firm, seller industry, and exporting country. The
trading partner is considered to be an affiliate when the group owns at least 50% of equity; thus, only cases
where there is a relationship of control over the affiliate are considered. The firm’s industry affiliation is
provided at the 4-digit NAF 1993 level. The Nomenclature d’Activite´s Franc¸aise 1993 corresponds closely
to the 4-digit NACE Rev 1 Classification (although slightly more disaggregated), which is in turn close to
the 4-digit ISIC Rev3 Classification. We will refer to each NAF code as the “Buyer industry.” Carluccio
and Fally (2012) use these data to study the link between sourcing modes and financial development.
Corcos et al. (2013) and Defever and Toubal (2013) use it to test the predictions of property rights models
of the multinational firm.
The data provide a good representation of the activity of international groups located in France. They
account for around 82% of total trade flows by multinationals, and 55% and 61% of total French imports
and exports, respectively. The dataset was crossed-referenced with alternative sources to check its validity.
The trade flow data were found to be consistent with customs data and the intra-firm trade flows consistent
with data on the location of French affiliates (INSEE’s Financial Links Survey “LIFI,” Bank of France and
French General Treasury and Economic Policy Directorate - DGTPE - data). The data are very rich, but
they have one potential drawback, common in survey data, which is non-response. If non-response is non-
random, failing to correct for it might result in biased estimators. We do not believe this is a serious concern
for our results. First, all of our results include firm dummies. Second, in all of our regressions we use an
inverse probability-weighted estimator. Inverse probability weighting inflates the weights of observations
belonging to firms that are underrepresented (e.g., small firms).19 Finally, Corcos et al. (2013) argue that
the data might be potentially biased towards intra-firm because it includes only firms having at least one
foreign affiliate. To correct for this potential bias, they complement the SESSI survey with comprehensive
data on firm-level trade flows from the French Customs Office. As a third robustness check we report, in
19The SESSI provides the sampling probabilities, which are obtained with a Logistic model using as explanatory variables:
trade flows; nationality of the controlling group; 2-digit sector classification; and an indicator of how many INSEE surveys
the firm answers. More details can be made available from the authors upon request. See also Defever and Toubal (2013).
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the Data Appendix, the results obtained when applying their correction (along with more details on this
methodology).20
Data on worker bargaining power across countries
Testing the model’s implications calls for an empirical counterpart to λc; such empirical measure has been
labeled WBPc in our main empirical equation (20). Important determinants of the balance of power
between firms and workers are the regulations governing the labor markets. Industrial relations laws
regulate relationships between firms and organized workers, providing the framework within which the
bargaining process takes place.
The most comprehensive database on labor market regulations across countries is the one developed
by Botero et al. (2004). These authors have assembled country-level data on three different categories
of labor law for the year 1997.21 We use an index that measures the protection of employees engaged
in collective disputes, which we label “Worker bargaining power” (it is the “Collective disputes index” in
the Botero et al., 2004, database). It considers several aspects of labor law that determine the balance
of power between employers and employees during industrial conflicts. These include whether the right
to collective action is permitted by law, whether strikes are legal and, if so, the ease with which they can
take place, and the extent to which employers can react with lockouts or by replacing striking workers.
This index varies between 0 and 1, with higher values representing stronger bargaining power of workers.
It provides an empirical proxy for (1− λc). The Data Appendix provides more details.
Table 1 lists the countries used in the regressions, together with their index value. The table reveals a
large variation that does not seem to be driven by any clear pattern, be it geographical or by per capita
income level. The variation is remarkably strong across OECD countries, which represent an otherwise
homogeneous group in terms of economic development and institutional quality. The sample median is
0.44 (std dev. 0.15). The median across OECD and non OECD countries is of 0.45 (std dev 0.12) and 0.42
(std dev 0.16), respectively. Labor market regulation varies a great deal across countries and development
levels worldwide. We exploit this strong cross-country variation in our econometric analysis.
In robustness checks, we use the “Union power subindex,” from the same source, which measures the
statutory power and protection of trade unions, and the “Collective relations laws index,” which is an
average of both indexes. We also use data on labor market institutions from Nickell (2006) for a group
of OECD countries (listed in the Data Appendix). We use the measure of union coverage, defined as
the number of workers covered by collective agreements normalized on employment, for the year 1999.
This measure has been commonly used as a proxy for union power (e.g., Hirsch, 1992). In a subset of
regressions we restrict the analysis to imports from the US, and exploit variation in unionization rates
and union coverage across industries within the US (the only country that releases detailed industry-level
unionization data). The data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the US
Census Bureau.
The Data Appendix provides a detailed description of the labor market data and other country-level
variables, as well as their correlations (Table 7).
20We thank Giordano Mion for kindly sharing the codes to run this estimator.
21The data are available online at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/labor dataset qje dataforweb 20
05.xls. Previous works using these data include Tang (2012).
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Table 1: Worker bargaining power index by country (Botero et al., 2004)
OECD
Worker bargaining power Worker bargaining power
Denmark 0.13 Germany 0.50
Finland 0.21 Hungary 0.50
Canada 0.25 Ireland 0.50
Austria 0.29 Netherlands 0.50
Korea 0.38 New Zealand 0.50
Turkey 0.38 Switzerland 0.50
UK 0.38 Greece 0.54
US 0.38 Japan 0.54
Belgium 0.42 Mexico 0.58
Poland 0.42 Norway 0.58
Australia 0.46 Portugal 0.58
Spain 0.46 Italy 0.83
Sweden 0.46
Non-OECD
Jamaica 0.17 Malaysia 0.38
Kenya 0.17 Uruguay 0.38
Egypt 0.25 Zimbabwe 0.46
Ghana 0.25 Indonesia 0.50
Taiwan 0.25 Venezuela 0.50
Zambia 0.25 Bolivia 0.54
South Africa 0.38 Colombia 0.54
Chile 0.33 Singapore 0.54
Israel 0.33 Argentina 0.58
Jordan 0.33 Sri Lanka 0.58
Thailand 0.33 Hong Kong 0.63
Tunisia 0.33 India 0.63
Uganda 0.33 Panama 0.63
Pakistan 0.33 Senegal 0.63
Brazil 0.38 Peru 0.71
China 0.38 Ecuador 0.75
Estimating Sample
We restrict the sample to importers that belong to manufacturing industries and import HS4 codes classified
as manufactures (NACE Rev1 2-Digit codes 15 to 37). The Data Appendix provides further details of how
the data was cleaned.22
Our empirical analysis focuses solely on imports from countries for which measures of labor market
regulations and other country-level controls are available. The list of these countries is provided in Table 1.
We obtain a baseline estimating dataset comprising 3,102 firms that import from 1,028 HS4 seller industries
and 57 origin countries, including both developing and developed economies (see the Data Appendix). The
average number of seller industries by firm is 10, with a standard deviation of 12 and a maximum of 164.
22Importantly, we drop retailers. Also for consistency we exclude Tobacco (16) and Coke (23) industries, since, as pointed
out by Antra`s (2003) and Defever and Toubal (2013), sourcing modes in these industries are likely to be determined by other
factors such as national sovereignty. All of our results are robust to their inclusion (they represent only 211 observations).
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The average firm imports from 7 countries (standard deviation 5) and the maximum number of countries
by firm in the data is 37. 84% of observations corresponds to firms importing the same industry code from
at least two different countries. These features of the data allow us to exploit within-firm variation across
countries in the econometric analysis. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in
the analysis.
Table 2: Summary statistics of main variables
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs.
Dependent variable
Share of intra-firm imports 0.28 0.43 0 1 85,909
Labor market variables
Worker bargaining power 0.44 0.15 0.13 0.83 57
Collective relations index 0.43 0.13 0.19 0.71 57
Union power subindex 0.43 0.19 0 0.71 57
Union coverage 1999 0.66 0.28 0.15 0.98 18
Labor rigidity index 0.45 0.18 0.15 0.82 57
Country-level variables
(log) Capital endowment 10.5 1.3 6.5 12 57
Trade openness 68 14.4 24 90 57
FDI openness 65.5 12 30 90 57
Rule of law 0.65 0.20 0.3 0.97 57
(log) Skill endowment 2.4 0.82 0.26 3.7 57
IPR protection 364 83 174 487 57
Entry costs 0.37 0.69 0 4.6 57
Creditors’ rights 1.9 1.2 0 4 57
Corporate tax 31.3 5.8 15 45.1 57
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of intra-firm imports at the firm - seller industry - exporting country level.
The baseline estimating dataset contains 85,909 firm - seller industry - exporting country cells with
information on the share of intra-firm imports. Of these, 65% are pure outsourcing (share of intra-firm
trade equal to zero), 22% are pure intra-firm (share of intra-firm trade equal to one) and 13% are a
combination of both (share of intra-firm trade between zero and one). The average share of intra-firm
trade by firm - seller industry - exporting country is 0.28 (standard deviation 0.43). Over half of the firms
in the sample reports imports using both sourcing modes (1,788).
4.2 Worker bargaining power and intra-Firm trade: empirical results
We start by confronting Empirical Prediction 1 to the data. We estimate equation (20) by ordinary least
squares. It allows the inclusion of a large set of dummies and avoids the incidental parameter problem
that arises with maximum likelihood estimation. (Results are similar using maximum likelihood techniques
and keeping only observations taking values of either 0% or 100%.) We proxy for the bargaining power of
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workers using the index developed by Botero et al.(2004) that was described in Section 4.1 above.23
Table 3: Worker bargaining power and intra-firm trade
Dependent variable: Share of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worker bargaining power -0.065** -0.102*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038)
Labor rigidity index -0.060* -0.061*
(0.035) (0.036)
Rule of law 0.194** 0.144* 0.150
(0.083) (0.082) (0.095)
FDI openness 0.002** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade openness -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Entry costs (% of gdp) -0.018 -0.023 -0.022
(0.058) (0.054) (0.054)
IPR protection 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Creditor’s rights -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Corporate tax rate 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance (weighted) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
French speaking -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.062***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Capital endowment -0.013 0.007 0.008
(0.026) (0.029) (0.031)
Skill endowment -0.042*** -0.040** -0.040**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP per capita -0.004
(0.034)
# Clusters 57 57 57 57
Seller industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85,909 85,909 85,909 85,909
R-squared 0.599 0.604 0.604 0.604
Notes: The regressions are OLS estimations of (20). The dependent variable is the share of intra-firm imports from seller industry s
from exporting country c by firm i. Dummies by firm and seller industry and a constant are included in all specifications. “Worker
bargaining power” measures the power and protection of workers during industrial conflicts. Both are obtained from Botero et
al. (2004)- details are provided in the Data Appendix. “Labor Rigidity Index” is the “Employment Laws Index” from Botero
et al. (2004). “Rule of law” is an index weighting variables capturing the perceptions of individuals about the enforcement of
contracts from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) in 1997 and 1998. “FDI openness” and “Trade openness” are from the
Heritage Foundation. “Entry costs” measures of the cost of obtaining legal status to operate a firm (normalized by per capita
GDP in 1999) from Djankov et al. (2002). “IPR Protection” in 2000 is drawn from Ginarte and Park (1997). “Creditor’s rights”
in 1999 comes from Djankov et al. (2007) and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). “Corporate tax”
is the top tax rate to corporations from World Tax database (U. of Michigan). “Distance” is between the biggest cities of any two
countries, weighted by population from CEPII. “French speaking” equals one if French is the exporting country’s official or national
language. “Capital endowment” is the log of the stock capital per worker from the Penn World Tables. “Skill endowment” is the
percentage of the population over age 25 with at least secondary education from Barro and Lee (2001). “GDP per capita” is the
log of GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country are reported
in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
23We next use alternative measures as robustness checks.
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Table 3 presents the results. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are shown in parentheses.
Given that WBPc varies across countries we cluster errors at the country level (see Moulton, 1986). In
column (1) we run an univariate regression and obtain the expected sign. In the remaining two columns
we add a large set of controls. Worker bargaining power has a negative and statistically significant effect,
at the 1% confidence level, on the share of intra-firm imports. Take the estimate from column (4). Its
interpretation is straightforward: going from the lowest value in the sample (Denmark, 0.13) to the highest
(Italy, 0.83), reduces the share of intra-firm imports at the firm level by 10.8%. Hence, if Italy had
Denmark’s collective bargaining institutions, the share of intra-firm exports to France would increase by
7,6% (0,108 × (0.83-0.13)). This effect is sizeable and economically meaningful, provided that the mean
intra-firm share in the sample is of 28%.24
An empirically convenient fact is that labor market regulations tend to be uncorrelated with measures
of economic and institutional development (see Table 7 in the Data Appendix). We nevertheless include
as many controls as possible to make sure we are picking up the effect of WBPc. Our measure of worker
bargaining power is based on statutory laws and regulations. Regulations are effective as long as the law is
enforced in the exporting countries. In column (2) we control for the general level of contract enforcement
with the rule of law index taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). This variable comes out
positive and significant at the 5% level (although it losses some explanatory power when we enlarge the
set of covariates in columns (3) and (4)). In column (3) we add the labor rigidity index from Botero et
al. (2004). Although more rigid labor markets tend to discourage intra-firm trade, the effect of bargaining
power is larger and statistically stronger.
The remaining controls, included in columns (2) to (4), confirm findings from previous studies. We
include FDI and trade openness indicators from the Heritage Foundation. As expected, intra-firm import
shares are higher from countries with policies favoring foreign investors. Openness to trade, however, is
associated with larger values of arm’s-length trade. Bernard et al. (2010) find qualitatively similar effects
for US-based multinationals. We also add a measure of creditor’s rights from Djankov et al. (2007) as it
was shown in Carluccio and Fally (2012) that financial development provides incentives for outsourcing.
In the same columns, we include the top corporate tax rate from the World Tax Database. In addition, we
include the Ginarte and Park (2000) index of intellectual property rights protection (IPR). Investors might
be more reluctant to outsource in countries with weak intellectual property rights’ protection, an intuition
not supported by the data. In columns (2) to (4) we address an important concern. Countries that impose
tighter regulations on the labor markets might tend to actively regulate other aspects of economic life as well
(Botero et al., 2004). Hence, the negative sign associated with the worker bargaining power variable might
be picking up the effects of stricter overall regulatory systems. We control for the propensity to regulate
firms’ activities including a measure of the cost of obtaining legal status to operate a firm (normalized by
per capita GDP in 1999), drawn from Djankov et al. (2002). As could be expected, this variable comes
out negative and significant at the 1% level. Its inclusion does not affect the significance of the worker
bargaining power index. We also include a dummy for French speaking country, and a measure of physical
distance. Speaking the same language tends to encourage arm’s-length relationships. We control for factor
price differences using factor endowments. We obtain an imprecise estimate of the effect of the capital
endowment. This is possibly due to the large measurement errors likely to plague this variable, and our
24In Denmark, over three-quarters of workers are union members, and the country’s “Union power subindex” is 0,71.
Experts in the Danish labor market, however, classify the country as having one of the most flexible labor markets in the
world (e.g., Hummels et al., 2014). In Table 4 we control for the “Union power subindex.”
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clustering strategy. We also find that the effect of skill endowment is negative. Finally, in column (4) we
control for GDP per capita.
The results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of controls related to the regulatory and
institutional profiles of exporting countries.
Sensitivity analysis: alternative samples and measures for WBPc.
Table 4 presents a series of robustness checks and extensions. All regressions include the full set of controls
of column (4) in Table 3. The first column uses the “Collective relations laws” index from Botero et al.
(2004), which has a stronger effect than our main measure. It is an average of our main variable and
the “Union power subindex,” that measures the statutory protection of trade unions. In column (2), we
introduce both components in the same regression. The variables measure different aspects of collective
bargaining, and both have the expected negative and significant sign. Interestingly, the inclusion of the
“Union power subindex” increases the magnitude of WBPc. The data suggests that enhanced rights to
industrial action, as captured by WBPc, are a more important determinant of sourcing modes than the
rights related to forming labor unions.
Table 4: Worker bargaining power and intra-firm trade: sensitivity
Dependent variable: Share of intra-firm imports
Sample: Full Full OECD 18 OECD Switchers Full OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Collective relations index -0.202***
(0.058)
Worker bargaining power -0.148*** -0.177*** -0.151*** 0.056 -0.008
(0.044) (0.033) (0.052) (0.043) (0.041)
Union power subindex -0.077**
(0.031)
Union coverage 1999 -0.228***
(0.039)
WBPc × int good dummy -0.205*** -0.215***
(0.026) (0.030)
# Clusters 57 57 18 25 57 57 25
Full set of country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85,909 85,909 76,488 79,881 63,986 85,909 79,881
R-squared 0.604 0.604 0.628 0.621 0.461 0.610 0.627
Notes: The regressions are OLS estimations of (20). The dependent variable is the share of intra-firm imports from seller industry s
and exporting country c by firm i. Dummies by firm and seller industry and a constant are included in all specifications. “Worker
bargaining power” measures the power and protection of workers during industrial conflicts. The “Union Power subindex” measures the
statutory protection of trade unions. The “Collective Relations index” synthetically combines the “Worker bargaining power index” and
the “Union Power subindex” using a simple average. The three variables are obtained from Botero et al. (2004)- details are provided
in the Data Appendix. “OECD” includes all OECD members as of 1999. “OECD 18” includes OECD countries with data on union
coverage (full list in the Data Appendix). “Switchers” includes only firms that report positive imports under both sourcing modes across
countries and seller industries (1788 firms). “int good dummy” equals one if the seller industry is different from the buyer industry to
which the firm belongs. All regressions include the full set of country-levels controls of column (4) in Table 3. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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In column (3) we use a traditional proxy for worker bargaining power which is union coverage, available
for 18 OECD countries (listed in the Data Appendix). We next use two alternative subsamples. Column
(4) includes only OECD countries (as of 1999).25 These countries constitute a homogeneous group in terms
of economic development. They still display large variation in the collective bargaining index (mean of 0.45
and std. dev. of 0.14) enabling us to check if the results provided so far are not driven by broad differences in
income or institutional development.26 In column (5), we restrict the estimating sample solely to firms that
report positive imports under both sourcing modes across countries and seller industries (“Switchers”).
The significant and large coefficient associated with the collective bargaining index alleviates concerns
about our results being driven by firm self-selection into outsourcing. In columns (6) and (7) we interact
WBPc with a dummy equal to one if the seller industry is different from the buyer industry. Around 78%
of observations have “int good dummy”=1 (the definition follows the Feenstra and Hanson, 1999, criterion
to measure intermediate goods, see the Data Appendix for details). Consistently with the model, results
hold for more refined definitions of vertical production chains, even within the OECD.
In the Data Appendix we report the results obtained when applying the methodology developed in
Corcos et al. (2013) to account for sample selection into the SESSI dataset. We also present, in the Online
Appendix, a similar analysis to that in Table 3, with the dependent variable defined at the firm-country
level. Our results carry through in both cases.
Within-country evidence: exploiting variation across US industries.
We complement the above results with within-country, cross-industry evidence. The US Census Bureau
releases information on unionization rates across industries (classified with the Census Industry Classi-
fication CIC, comprising 82 manufacturing industries). Union membership and coverage are traditional
proxies for worker bargaining power (Hirsch, 1992). Restricting to imports from the US, these data provide
us with industry variation that completely controls for country-level characteristics. The US represents
11% of the value of imports in the data, and 8.7% of the number of transactions. The average share of
intra-firm trade at the firm - seller industry level is 0.4, above the sample mean of 0.28. The number of
seller industries (HS4 products) is 589. Because of a lack of correspondence between HS4 and CIC codes,
we aggregate the trade data at the HS3 level. We then map HS3 trade flows into CIC codes. (Details are
provided in the Data Appendix.)
We regress the share of intra-firm imports from the US at the HS3 level on unionization of the CIC
industries to which each HS3 product maps. We estimate:
IHS3 us = γ(Union membership)CIC us + ρControlsCIC us + η tariffsHS3 us + HS3 us (21)
where IHS3 us is the share of intra-firm imports from the US at the HS3 level, (Union membership)CIC us
proxies for worker bargaining power at the industry level. We include a vector of industry-level (CIC) con-
trols as well as ad-valorem tariffs imposed in the EU on US exports at the HS3 level. HS3 us is an error
term.
Table 5 provides the results. Given that CIC codes encompass several HS3 products, we cluster standard
errors at the CIC level. In line with the cross-country evidence, worker bargaining power discourages intra-
25Excluding the Czech Republic and Iceland because they are not included in the Botero et al. (2004) dataset.
26The negative relationship between intra-firm trade and WBPc holds for the subsample of non-OECD countries, but the
small number of observations prevents us from developing a detailed econometric analysis.
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firm trade. The set of industry-level controls include factor intensities, the ratio of value added to total
industry shipments (measuring average vertical integration), the share of differentiated goods in total
production, and a measure of ad-valorem EU-US tariffs. Union membership is significant at the 1% level
in all four specifications. In column (4), we use union coverage instead (due to the US legislation, their
correlation is of 0.99). In column (5), the dependent variable is defined at the firm-seller industry level
(including controls for firm size and labor productivity, both in logs).
Table 5: Unionization rates across US industries (imports from the US only)
Dependent variable: Share of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Union membership)CIC us -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
(Union coverage)CIC us -0.011***
(0.003)
(k/l)CIC us -0.014 0.012 0.004 -0.036***
(0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.013)
(VA/shipments)CIC us 0.367 0.419 0.061
(0.355) (0.356) (0.091)
(h/l)CIC us -0.098 -0.141* -0.126 0.003
(0.069) (0.077) (0.079) (0.034)
Av specCIC us 0.044 0.043 0.049*
(0.056) (0.056) (0.025)
EU-US tariffs (HS3) -0.131 -0.140 -0.636**
(0.243) (0.249) (0.238)
# Clusters 50 50 50 50 50
Observations 162 162 162 162 4,140
R-squared 0.124 0.138 0.151 0.143 0.047
Notes: The regressions are OLS estimations of (21). The dependent variable is a weighted share of intra-firm imports aggre-
gated at the HS3 level of the seller industry, except in column (5) where it is defined at the firm-seller industry level. “Union
MembershipCIC us” is the percentage of workers who are union members, and Union CoverageCIC us is the percentage who are
covered by union contracts. (k/l)CIC us is the (log) of capital to employment ratio. (h/l)CIC us is the ratio of non-production to
total workers. Av specCIC us is the production-weighted average of the Rauch (1999) index. All sector variables are defined at
the 3-digit CIC level. EU-US tariffs (HS3) are ad valorem tariffs imposed by the EU to the US. Sources and details are in the Data
Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by CIC codes are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Worker bargaining power, relationship-specific capital and intra-firm trade
The theoretical analysis predicts capital intensity should only matter when capital is relationship-specific.
We distinguish the industries where the importer’s investments have relatively large value outside the
relationship from those where this value is substantially lower. To obtain an empirical measure of specificity
we use the measure developed in Rauch (1999). It classifies commodities according to whether they are sold
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on organized exchanges, referenced priced, or neither one of these. Goods sold in an organized exchange
tend to be standardized and to have potentially many buyers and sellers (“thick” markets). On the contrary,
goods that are not sold in organized exchanges tend to be differentiated and are traded in thinner markets.
The value of standardized goods for a particular buyer-seller pair does not differ much from the value
they have for other pairs of agents. Differentiation, however, tends to create a wedge between the value
of a good inside a relationship and the value it has outside this particular relationship. Goods that are
reference-priced lie in between these two cases. Nunn (2007) develops a measure of relationship-specific
inputs based on these intuitions.
Using the Rauch classification we classify buyer industries into being “specific” or not, in the above
sense. We also construct a measure of capital intensity at the buyer industry level - an empirical proxy
for β - based on firm-level data. Details of the construction of the variables are provided in the Data
Appendix. Table OA2 in the Online Appendix shows intra-firm trade is increasing in the specific capital
of the buyer industry, as predicted by the property rights theory of the firm. These results complement
Nunn and Trefler (2013) and Antra`s and Chor (2013), who use disaggregated data on different types of
capital. Importantly, they imply that our measure is a good proxy for the relationship-specificity nature of
the headquarter investments. The table also suggests that the relationship between capital intensity and
intra-firm trade is less steep for the group of countries with high WBPc.
Results
We now look into Empirical Prediction 2. We test whether the effect of worker bargaining power is
heterogeneous according to the capital intensity of the buyer industry, indexed by n. We interact WBPc
with two dummy variables. ((k/l)n > median) equals 1 if (k/l)n is above the sample median and zero
otherwise, and ((k/l)n < median) equals 1 if (k/l)n is below the sample median and zero otherwise. We
estimate the following equation, both for the complete sample and the sample consisting only of specific
industries:
Iisc = γ1(WBPc × (k/l)n > median) + γ2(WBPc × (k/l)n < median) + βXc + θs + δi + isc (22)
We expect γ̂1 < 0, γ̂2 < 0 and |γ̂1| > |γ̂2|. The ranking implies that the likelihood of intra-firm imports
is lower for country-industry pairs for which both capital intensity and worker bargaining power are large.
Results are presented in Table 6. All regressions include the full set of country-level controls of column (4)
in Table 3.
In the first column, we estimate (22) for the entire sample. In column (2), we re-estimate it for the
subsample of specific industries (we recalculate the ranking of industries according to capital intensity
for this subsample).27 In this case, γ̂1 is larger than γ̂2 in absolute values. The reduction in the share
of intra-firm trade that is due to WBPc is larger for the capital-intensive industries. From column (3)
onwards all regressions include a full set of interactions of GDP per capita with buyer industry dummies,
following Nunn and Trefler (2014). We also add interactions between WBPc and buyer industry controls,
which the literature has identified as determinants of intra-firm trade. These are: a measure of elasticity of
demand taken from Broda et al. (2006) (see Antra`s and Chor, 2013), a measure of dispersion constructed
using comprehensive firm-level data for French manufacturing (see e.g., Antra`s and Helpman, 2004), and
27The number of clusters is reduced because there are no imports in relationship-specific buyer industries from the following
three countries: Kenya, Senegal and Uganda.
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Table 6: Worker bargaining power, specificity and capital intensity
Full Sample Relationship-Specific Industries
(k/l)n measured with: French data US data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WBPc × ((k/l)n > median) -0.102** -0.133*** -0.150** -0.150** -0.155**
(0.041) (0.047) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060)
WBPc × ((k/l)n < median) -0.115*** -0.082* -0.094 -0.094 -0.106
(0.038) (0.046) (0.065) (0.065) (0.083)
WBPc × Elasticity of Demand 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
WBPc × Buyer Tariffs 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
WBPc × Buyer Dispersion -4.205** -4.205** -3.914*
(2.026) (2.026) (2.292)
GDP p.c. × ((k/l)n < median) -0.039
(0.037)
GDP p.c. × ((k/l)n > median) -0.047
(0.031)
GDP per capita -0.007 -0.002 -0.039 -0.031 -0.003
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033)
WBP c -0.107**
(0.044)
# Clusters 57 54 54 54 53 54
GDP × buyer industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes No
Full set of country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seller industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85,725 58,976 53,025 53,025 47,267 58,976
R2 0.537 0.542 0.556 0.556 0.560 0.542
Notes: The regressions are OLS estimations of (22). WBPc is “Worker bargaining power.” It measures the power and protection of
workers during industrial conflicts, from Botero et al. (2004)- details are provided in the Data Appendix.(k/l)n is the 4-digit NAF
median of firm level (log) ratio of the capital stock to total employment. ((k/l)n > median) equals 1 if (k/l)n is above the sample
median and zero otherwise, and ((k/l)n < median) equals 1 if (k/l)n is below the sample median and zero otherwise. “Relationship-
specific industries” is the subsample of industries with Specn = 1. Specn is a binary variable that equals 1 if the 4-digit industry is
classified as specific (see the Data Appendix for details). “Elasticity of demand” comes from Broda et al. (2006). “Buyer Tariffs” is the
import-weighted tariff from WITS at the buyer industry level across all imports and sourcing countries. “Dispersion” is the coefficient
of variation of the buyer industry constructed using detailed French firm-level data. Details of the sources and construction of these
measures are provided in the Data Appendix. All regressions include the full set of country-levels controls of column (4) in Table 3.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
a measure of trade costs built using import-weighted tariffs. Their inclusion increases the coefficients
associated with the interactions of WBPc with the capital intensity measures, and somewhat reduces
their significance levels. In column (4), we interact GDP per capita with the capital intensity dummies. In
column (5), we measure capital intensity with US data, to avoid the possibility of endogeneity in the capital
intensity measures.28 The values of γ̂1 and γ̂2 are remarkably similar to those obtained with French data.
As a robustness check, column (6) restricts the sample to the specific industries but ignores the differential
effect across (k/l)n. The coefficient is very close to that in column (4) of Table 3. (For the subsample of
28The correlation between French and US capital data is of 0.70. In column (5) we lose some observations because of the
imperfect mapping between SIC87 and NAF codes in the Food industry (corresponding to ISIC Rev2 2-digit code 15), and
this restriction implies that there are no observations for Ecuador.
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non-specific industries we obtain similar but noisier results - at the 5% level. They are reported in the
Online Appendix, in Table OA1.)
Our estimates imply that, when evaluated at the sample mean of 0.44, WBPc reduces the share of
intra-firm imports by 7% in the capital-intensive industries, and by 4% in the labor-intensive ones. An
F-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of γ̂1 and γ̂2 within a 5% confidence interval, providing support
to Empirical Prediction 2.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present an empirical analysis linking the sourcing modes of multinationals located in
France to the bargaining power of workers in countries from which these firms import. Our results show
that the bargaining power of workers in exporting countries has a negative and economically meaningful
effect on the share of intra-firm trade. They hold for different measures of bargaining power and are
robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls. Furthermore, similar results are found when we exploit
variation in worker bargaining power across US industries. Our estimations also indicate that the negative
correlation between intra-firm imports and worker bargaining power increases with capital intensity, only
for the subsample of relationship-specific industries.
We have motivated our analysis with a simple model of foreign sourcing under incomplete contracts.
The theoretical predictions are as follows. First, firms engage in outsourcing when worker bargaining power
is strong. Second, the relative profitability of outsourcing increases with capital intensity, when capital has
no outside value. This second prediction contrasts with the theoretical predictions of models based purely
on incomplete contracts between firms, which have hitherto been the focus of the literature.
Overall, our results argue for a novel perspective on the role of labor market institutions in shaping the
international organization of production.
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Theory Appendix
5.1 Solutions
Efficient production: Using the revenue function (2) we have:
∂R
∂k
=
βα
k
A1−α
(
k
β
)βα(
l
1− β
)(1−β)α
∂R
∂l
=
(1− β)α
l
A1−α
(
k
β
)βα(
l
1− β
)(1−β)α
(23)
Setting ∂R∂k = r and
∂R
∂l = ω and solving the 2-equation system we find:
kE =
β
r
Aα
1
1−α
(
rβω1−β
) −α
1−α lE =
(1− β)
ω
Aα
1
1−α
(
rβω1−β
) −α
1−α
Inserting back in (2) gives expression (4).
Vertical Integration: The ex-ante problem for F is described by the following program:
max
kv
piv = R(kv, lv) − wvlv − rkv
s.t.
wv = (1− λ)R(kv, lv) 1lv + λω
∂R
∂l = ω
R(kv, lv) = A
1−α
(
kv
β
)βα (
lv
1−β
)(1−β)α
The first order condition is ∂R∂k =
r
λ , where
∂R
∂k is given by (23). This expression, together with the second
constraint in the maximization program, form a 2-equation system with solution (kv, lv). Substituting in
the third constraint gives revenues as provided in expression (8) in the main text, and inserting (kv, lv) in
the first constraint gives the equilibrium wage wv. The full expressions are:
kv =
βλ
r Aα
1
1−α
((
r
λ
)β
ω1−β
) −α
1−α
lv =
(1−β)
ω Aα
1
1−α
((
r
λ
)β
ω1−β
) −α
1−α
wv =
1−λ[1−(1−β)α]
(1−β)α ω
Inserting (kv, lv, wv) into the objective function we obtain expression (8) in the main text. Union utility
is obtained by inserting (wv, lv) into U(wv, lv) = (wv − ω)lv.
We get: U(wv, lv) = (1− λ)[1− (1− β)α]Aα α1−α
((
r
λ
)β
ω1−β
) −α
1−α
Outsourcing: The ex-ante problem for F is described by the following program:
max
ko
pio = φR(ko, lo)− rko
s.t.
wo = (1− λ)(1− φ)R(ko, lo) 1lo + λω
∂R
∂l =
ω
(1−φ)
R(ko, lo) = A
1−α
(
ko
β
)βα (
lo
1−β
)(1−β)α
The first order condition is ∂R∂k =
r
φ , where
∂R
∂k is given by (23). This expression, together with the second
constraint in the maximization program, form a 2-equation system with solution (ko, lo). Substituting in
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the third constraint gives revenues as provided in expression (11) in the main text, and inserting (ko, lo)
in the first constraint gives the equilibrium wage wo. The full expressions are:
ko =
βφ
r Aα
1
1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1−φ
)1−β) −α1−α
lo =
(1−β)(1−φ)
ω Aα
1
1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1−φ
)1−β) −α1−α
wo =
1−λ[1−(1−β)α]
(1−β)α ω
Inserting (ko, lo) into the objective function we obtain expression (8) in the main text.
M’s payoff is: piMo = (1− φ)R(ko, lo)− wolo = λ(1− φ)(1− (1− β)α)Aα
α
1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1−φ
)1−β) −α1−α
Union utility is: U(wo, lo) = (1− λ)(1− φ)[1− (1− β)α]Aα α1−α
((
r
φ
)β (
ω
1−φ
)1−β) −α1−α
5.2 Proofs of Section 2.2
The following proofs use the fact that, for any given function f(x) = ab(x) where a is a constant and b(x)
a subfunction of the variable x, we have: ∂f(x)∂x = a
b(x) ln(a)∂b(x)∂x (Property 1 ).
Proof of Lemma 1: ∂piv∂λ =
1−(1−β)α
1−α λ
βα
1−α (1− α)Aα α1−α (rβω1−β) −α1−α > 0
Proof of Proposition 1: Proposition 1 studies how F’s choice of organization depends on λ. F chooses
the organizational from that provides him with the highest payoff. Thus, he chooses vertical integration
if piv(λ, .) > pio(.), he chooses outsourcing if piv(λ, .) < pio(.) and he is indifferent if piv(λ, .) = pio(.), where
piv(λ, .) and pio(.) are given respectively in expressions (8) and (11) in the main text. Note that pio(.) does
not depend on λ. Now let us define λ∗ as the value of λ such that piv(λ∗, .) = pio(.). Solving we find:
λ∗(β, φ, α) ≡
φ(1− βα)
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
) α
1−α
(1− α)

1−α
1−(1−β)α
Lemma 1 shows piv(λ, .) is an increasing function of λ, and inspection of pio in (11) shows that it is
independent of λ. It follows that piv(λ, .) > pio(.) for any λ > λ
∗(β, φ, α) and that piv(λ, .) < pio(.) for any
λ < λ∗(β, φ, α). To complete the proof we need to show that 0 < λ∗ < 1. Inspection shows that λ∗ > 0 ∀
β ∈ (0, 1],∀ φ ∈ (0, 1), ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). To prove λ∗(β, φ, α) < 1 we follow the methodology in Antra`s (2003,
Appendix A). Define first a function Λ(β, φ, α) ≡ λ∗ 1−(1−β)α1−α .
Λ(β, φ, α) =
φ(1− βα)
(1− α)
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
)− α1−α
We now show Λ(β, φ, α) < 1 ∀ β ∈ (0, 1], ∀ φ ∈ (0, 1),∀ α ∈ (0, 1). which implies λ∗(β, φ, α) < 1 ∀
β ∈ (0, 1], ∀ φ ∈ (0, 1),∀ α ∈ (0, 1). First note that Λ(β, φ, 0) = φ < 1. It then suffices to show that
∂Λ(β, φ, 0)/∂α < 0 ∀ β ∈ (0, 1], ∀ φ ∈ (0, 1). We have, using Property 1 :
∂Λ(1, α, β, φ)
∂α
=
φ
(1− α)2
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
)− α1−α ×
32
−β(1− α)− (1− βα)
− ln
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
)
1− α − 1

Rearranging we find that ∂Λ(1,α,β,φ)∂α < 0 for:
ln
(
1
φβ(1− φ)1−β
)
> (1− α) 1− β
1− αβ ≡ z(α)
z(α) is a decreasing function of α with a maximum at z(0): 1−β. Hence, we need check if the condition
above holds for α = 0 to prove that it holds ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). In linear form it writes:
d(β, φ) ≡ β lnφ− (1− β) ln(1− φ) + β > 1
We have ∂d(β,φ)∂β > 0 for φ <
e
e+1 . Hence for φ <
e
e+1 we need to check if d(1, φ) > 0, which holds since
− ln(φ) + 1 > 1 ∀ φ ∈ (0, 1). And for φ > ee+1 we need to check if d(1, φ) < 0, which is also true since
− ln(1−φ) > 1 for φ > ee+1 . Therefore, we have that ∂Λ(1,α,β,φ)∂α < 0 ∀ φ ∈ (0, 1), ∀ β ∈ (0, 1), α φ ∈ (0, 1).
Together with ∂Λ(1,α,β,φ)∂α = φ this ensures that λ
∗(β, φ, α) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 2 is the outcome of a comparative static analysis on the cutoff
λ∗(β, φ, α). The proof is done by straightforward but lengthy differentiation. It proves useful to re-write
λ∗(β, φ, α) as:
λ∗(β, φ, α) = g(β)z(β)
With
g(β) =
φ(1−βα)(φβ(1−φ)1−β)
α
1−α
(1−α) z(β) =
1−α
1−(1−β)α
Partial differentiation of λ∗(β, φ, α) with respect to β gives:
∂λ∗(β)
∂β
= z(β)g(β)z(β)−1
∂g(β)
∂β
+ g(β)z(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β
Where the second term is follows from the use of Property 1. Rearranging:
∂λ∗(β)
∂β
= g(β)z(β)−1
[
z(β)
∂g(β)
∂β
+ g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β
]
(24)
The sign of ∂λ
∗(β)
∂β depends on the sign of
[
z(β)∂g(β)∂β + g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β
]
since g(β)z(β)−1 > 0. Using
Property 1 and collecting terms we have:
∂g(β)
∂β
=
α
1− αφ
(
φβ (1− φ)1−β
) α
1−α
[
ln
(
φ
1− φ
)
1− βα
1− α − 1
]
And deriving z(β) with respect to β:
∂z(β)
∂β
= − (1− α)α
(1− α+ βα)2
Inserting in
[
z(β)∂g(β)∂β + g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β
]
and rearranging we obtain:
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z(β)
∂g(β)
∂β
+ g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β
=
(
1− βα
1− α
)
1
1− α+ βα
[
− ln (1− φ)− (1− α) ln
(
1− βα
1− α
)]
− 1
The expression above depends on φ in a simple way. First note that z(β)∂g(β)∂β + g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β = 0
requires:
− ln(1− φ) = (1− α)
[
1− α+ βα
1− βα + ln
(
1− βα
1− α
)]
(25)
The LHS of (25) is a monotonically increasing function of φ taking values from 0 to +∞ in the
range φ ∈ [0, 1]. The RHS is a positive constant. It follows that there is a unique value of φ such that
z(β)∂g(β)∂β + g(β) ln(g(β))
∂z(β)
∂β = 0, and thus
∂λ∗(β)
∂β = 0. Call this threshold value φ
∗. It is given by
φ∗(α, β) = 1− e−(1−α)[ 1−α+βα1−βα +ln( 1−βα1−α )]. For φ > φ∗(α, β), we have ∂λ∗(β)∂β > 0, and for φ < φ∗(α, β), we
have ∂λ
∗(β)
∂β < 0. In Proposition 2 we have written for simplicity:
b(α, β) = (1− α)
[
1− α+ βα
1− βα + ln
(
1− βα
1− α
)]
To complete the proof, notice that b(α, β) > 0,∀ β ∈ (0, 1) and ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore 0 < φ∗(α, β) < 1
for ∀ β ∈ (0, 1) and ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). Finally, for completeness let us note that ∂φ∗(α,β)∂β = e−b(α,β) α(1−α)(1−βα)2 (1−
α(1− β)) > 0 and ∂φ∗(α,β)∂α = e−b(α,β) β+α(1−3β+β
2)
(1−βα)2(1−α) . The sign of
∂φ∗(α,β)
∂α is ambiguous and depends on
the interaction between β and α.
5.3 Section 3.1
Setup: The utility function is U = Qγy1−γ , with Q =
(∫
x∈X q(x)
α
) 1
α where X is the set of potential
varieties and 0 < α < 1 which follows from the assumption that σ > 1. The ideal price index associated
with Q is P =
(∫
x∈X p(x)
− α1−α
)− 1−αα . World income is E = ∑j∈J ωjLj . The production function is
market-specific because the labor unit requirements of capital vary across importer countries i and the
labor unit requirements of the input vary amjz across source countries j. Adapting (1) to incorporate the
new parameters we obtain q = ϕ
(
k
ahiβ
)β (
m
amjz(1−β)
)(1−β)
. Together with the demand function leads to
expression (15) in the main text (where we have introduced the trade costs τij).
Recall that final-good producers first draw their sourcing productivity amjz and then they choose the
organizational form. We assume that amjz is common knowledge. Using (15) we can compute operating
profits by following closely the deviations in Section 2.2 (adding subscripts (i, j, ij) when required and
using ωi instead of ri). We obtain:
piijV (ϕ) = Aα
α
1−α
(
(ωiahi)
β(ωjamjzτij)
1−β) −α1−α ϕ α1−αλ 1−(1−β)α1−αj (1− α)
piijO(ϕ) = Aα
α
1−α
(
(ωiahi)
β(ωjamjzτij)
1−β) −α1−α ϕ α1−αφj(1− βα)(φβj (1− φj)1−β) α1−α
hence ΥijV = λ
1−(1−β)α
1−α
j (1−α) and ΥijO = φj(1−βα)(φβj (1−φj)1−β)
α
1−α giving Γij =
λ
1−(1−β)α
1−α
j (1−α)
φj(1−βα)(φβj (1−φj)1−β)
α
1−α
,
which is the counterpart to (13) (with subscripts added).
The role of β: Although we have considered a model with one differentiated sector, it is straightforward
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to extend it to include a number of differentiated sectors and derive a sector-level expression for the share of
intra-firm trade, equivalent to (18), but with a sector subscript. In that case, one could investigate the role
of capital intensity, as done in the firm-level setup. Deriving the counterpart to Proposition 2 is cumbersome
given that Γij enters Shintra as an exponential function of β. Under an additional simplification we can
easily show the intuitions about the role of β carry on to Sh intra. Assume that θ = (1−β)α(1−α) so that (18)
becomes Sh intraij =
Γij
1+Γij
. We drop subscripts (ij). We have Γ(λ, β, φ, α) = λ
1−(1−β)α
1−α (1−α)
φ(1−βα)(φβ(1−φ)1−β)
α
1−α
-
see (13). First notice that
∂Sh intraij
∂β =
∂Γij/∂β
(Γij+1)2
.
Following very similar steps as in the previous proofs one can easily show that ∂Γλ,α,β,φ)∂β < 0 for
φ > e
x(λ,β,α)
1+ex(λ,β,α)
with x(λ, β, α) = 1−α1−αβ + ln(λ). x is an increasing function of λ with a maximum at
x(1, β, α) = 1−α1−αβ . Since
ex(λ,β,α)
1+ex(λ,β,α)
increases with x, φ > e
x(1,β,α)
1+ex(1,β,α)
is a sufficient condition for ∂Γ(λ,α,β,φ)∂β <
0 ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1). This in turn implies that ∂Sh intraij∂β < 0 ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1), ∀ β ∈ (0, 1) and ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
comparing two industries such that βh > βl, we have Sh intraij(βl) > Sh intraij(βh) ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈
(0, 1) and ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). As in the firm-level model the result requires a large enough value of φ.
Data Appendix
A: Data description
Labor Market Indexes: The Worker Bargaining Power variable is the “Collective protection subindex”
from Botero et al. (2004). It is constructed as the average of eight dummy variables that equal one: (1) if
employer lockouts are illegal, (2) if workers have the right to industrial action, (3) if wildcat, political and
sympathy/solidarity/secondary strikes are legal, (4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or notification
requirement before strikes can occur, (5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective agreement in force,
(6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, (7) if third party arbitration during a
labor dispute is mandated by law and (8) if it is illegal to fire or replace striking workers. The “Collective
relations laws index,” used in column (1) of Table 4 is the average of “Collective protection subindex” and
the “Union power subindex.” The latter is constructed as the average of seven binary variables that equal
one: (1) if employees have the right to unionize, (2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining,
(3) if employers have the legal duty to bargain with a union, (4) if collective contracts are extended to
third parties by law, (5) if the law allows closed shops, (6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to
appoint members to the board of directors, and (7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law.
In Table 4 we use union coverage in 1980 and 1999 from Nickell (2006) for 18 OECD countries.29 The
“Labor Rigidity Index” is the “Employment Laws Index” from Botero et al. (2004).
Country-level controls: The “rule of law” variable is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).
It weights a number of variables capturing the perceptions of individuals about contract enforcement. It
covers the years 1997 and 1998. The log of capital stock per worker in 1999 is taken from the Penn
World Tables and the measure of skill endowment is the percentage of the population aged over 25 with
at least secondary education in 1999 drawn from Barro and Lee (2001). Trade and FDI openness are
respectively the Trade Freedom and Investment Freedom indexes produced by Heritage Foundation for
29Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. The database also contains (other than France)
Austria, for which there is no data for the selected variable.
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2000. “Trade freedom” is based on the trade-weighted average rate (main source the World Bank WDR)
and on non-tariff barriers. “Investment freedom” measures equal treatment for foreign and domestic
investors. Protection of intellectual property rights in 2000, is drawn from Ginarte and Park (1997). The
top tax rate for corporations is provided by World Tax Database (University of Michigan). A caveat is
that the information refers to taxes on domestic companies, and different rates might apply on foreign
owned firms. We use it due to the lack of wide cross-country information on corporate taxes to foreign
firms. Distance is taken from CEPII. It measures bilateral distances between the biggest cities of any
two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s
population. French speaking equals 1 when French is the exporting country’s official or national languages
and languages spoken by at least 20% of the population of the country. Entry costs is a measure of the cost
of obtaining legal status to operate a firm (normalized by per capita GDP in 1999) taken from Djankov et
al. (2002). It includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, photocopies,
fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.). The company is assumed to have a start-up capital of ten
times per capita GDP in 1999. The index of Creditor’s rights in 1999 comes from Djankov et al. (2007)
and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). GDP per capita in 1999 comes from
the Penn World Tables and it is the PPP Converted GDP per Capita at current prices.
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Industry-level variables:
Specificity : Our aim is to construct a measure of specificity at the 4-digit NAF industry level. We proceed
as follows. First, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the 4-digit STIC4 rev2 commodity is classified as not
being sold in organized exchange or reference-priced in Rauch’s (1999) conservative classification. We then
use a correspondence table from 4-digit STIC4 rev2 to HS4 (available in Jon Haveman’s site).30 Finally,
we use a concordance table from HS4 to 4-digit NAF (provided by the INSEE) to construct a 4-digit NAF
level measure of relationship-specificity using production (from the SESSI dataset) as weights to obtain
Av specn ∈ [0, 1]. This measure has a mean of 0.66 (std. dev. 0.47). Its distribution is skewed to the left,
with 169 industries having Av specn = 1. Based on this, we classify those industries with Av specn = 1
as specific, and those with Av specn < 1 as non-specific. We use the most restrictive possible criteria in
constructing this variable. Results hold if we lower the threshold, for example, using Av specn > 0.75 as
the criterion. We have originally 282 4-digit NAF industries in the sample. There are 23 4-digit NAF
industries for which we could not map any 4-digit STIC4 rev2 commodity, and 5 with no information
on capital intensity. Observations corresponding to these industries are dropped from the regressions in
Table 6 and Table OA2 in the Online Appendix. The NAF codes are (the first two codes coincide with
NACE Rev 1): 159Q 159L 173Z 201A 222E 223A 223C 262J 266E 266G 275A 275C 275E 275G 281C 282A
282B 284A 284B 284C 285A 285C 285D 287A 296A 333Z 371Z 372Z. For illustrative purposes, Table 8
provides a list of five industries with Av specn = 1 and five with Av specn < 1 .
Table 8: Industry classification according to specificity: examples (NAF700 codes, 4-digit)
Classified as non-specific (average specificity <1 ) Classified as specific (average specificity=1)
Total number: 85 Total number: 169
Code Code
151E Industrial production of meat products 292A Ovens, furnaces and furnace burners manufacturing
274G First processing of lead, zinc and tin 295M Plastics and rubber machinery manufacturing
265E Plaster manufacturing 363Z Musical instruments manufacturing
241C Dyes and pigments manufacturing 300C Computers and peripheral equipment manufacturing
171A Spinning of cotton textiles 286D Mechanical tool manufacturing
Total number of industries with information on (k/l)n and specificity: 254
Notes: Author’s calculation based on Rauch’s (1999) commodity classification.
Capital intensity : Constructed using firm-level data from the EAE (Enquete Annuel d’Entreprises). It is
an annually conducted survey that provides detailed firm-level data for all French firms with more than 20
employees whose main activity is in manufacturing.31 We first use the firms in the sample with available
information on the capital stock to calculate the log of the ratio of the capital stock to total employment.
The median of this firm-level measure is then calculated for each of the 254 4-digit NAF industries in our
sample.
Intermediate good dummy : In Table 4 we use an “int good dummy” variable. The aim is to identify
whether the buyer and the seller industries are different, in which case, this dummy equals 1. As already
explained, the buyer industries in our data are classified using the 4-digit NAF classification and the seller
industries are classified using the HS system. To map HS4 codes into NAF codes we proceed as follows.
30There is no direct concordance between 4-digit STIC4 rev2 and the NAF or NACE classifications
31In spite of the size threshold the data remains highly representative. Eurostat reports that firms in the EAE accounted
for around 87% of manufacturing production value in 1999.
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Table 9: Capital intensity at industry-level (APE, 4-digit)
Highest Around the median Lowest
Code Code Code
158A Industrial manufacture of
bread and fresh pastry
287P Other metal objets manufac-
turing
273J Ferroalloy production
151A Processing and preserving of
meat
286D Mechanical tool manufactur-
ing
241N Rubber products manufac-
turing
151C Processing and preserving of
poultry meat
175G Other textile industries 265A Cement manufacturing
152Z Processing and preserving of
fish
287L Household metal objets
manufacturing
265C Lime manufacturing
151E Industrial production of
meat products
294D Solding material manufac-
turing
241A Industrial gas manufacturing
median (log) capital intensity across industries: 5.35
Notes: Source EAE. Industry capital intensity is calculated as the mean of the firm-level ratio of the capital stock to total
employment (in logs).
We first concord each HS4 code in our sample to 4-digit CPA Rev1 codes (Classification of Products by
Activity of the European Commision), which are equivalent to 4-digit NACE Rev 1.1 codes. We then use
concord 4-digit NACE into 4 digit NAF codes using concordance tables from INSEE. In the few cases
where a particular NACE mapped to more than one NAF code, we define it as intermediate good if the
NACE code is different than all NAF codes it maps to.
Buyer industry controls: Buyer industry-level controls in Table 6 include the elasticity of demand, a mea-
sure of tariffs, and a measure of sales dispersion. The elasticity of demand comes from Broda et al. (2006).
We use the demand elasticities for France which are presented at the HS3 level. We concord to 4-digit NAF
codes using concordance tables provided by the INSEE. When more than one HS3 code mapped into the
same 4-digit NAF codes we take a simple average. The tariff measure is constructed using applied tariffs
from the Worldbank’s WITS database. We use data from the French customs to identify imports flows
at the HS6-country level for each of buyer industries. We average imports flows for 1996-1999, and use
these averages to create weights associated with HS6. We then use the weights to create a trade-weighted
average of tariffs for each 4-digit NAF code. The dispersion measure is the coefficient of variation, defined
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of sales at the buyer industry - level, multiplied by 100
(it is a scale-free measure). This measure is constructed from firm-level data using the quasi-exhaustive
dataset BRN. We first take the average of total sales for each firm over the period 1996-1999, we then
calculate both the standard deviation and the mean for each aggregate 4-digit NAF industry.
Firm-level variables: constructed from additional information present in the SESSI dataset. Size is the
log of the nr. of employees and labor productivity is the log of value added divided by the nr. of employees.
US data on industry unionization and factor intensities: Data on union membership (% of workers
who are union members) coverage (% workers who are covered by union contracts) for 1999 for US manu-
facturing industries come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the US Census Bureau.
They are aggregated at the 3-digit CIC level (US Census Industry Classification, 82 manufacturing indus-
tries), which maps mostly into 3-digit 1987 SIC codes but sometimes 4- or 2-digit industries. The data were
downloaded from www.unionstats.com. There is no concordance between HS4 and 4-digit SIC87 or the CIC
classifications. We aggregate our HS4 trade data into HS3 codes and then map these flows into 4-digit SIC87
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codes using a concordance table provided by the US Census Bureau. Each SIC87 code maps into a single
CIC code, though many SIC87 codes may map into the same CIC (i.e. a many-to-one mapping). Restricting
to imports from the US we have 138 HS3 codes with positive flows. Out of these, 22 map into a single CIC
industry (though possibly into more than one 4-digit SIC87 codes). The remaining 116 HS3 mapped into 2
4-digit SIC87 industries or more, which in turn mapped into different CIC codes. They were assigned SIC87
codes using data on US exports to France at 4-digit SIC level, produced by the US Census Bureau and avail-
able at Peter Schott’s website: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/files/research/data/sic naics trade
20100504.pdf. First, SIC4 codes for which the Census reports a value of less than 50 thousand dollars
were disregarded. Second, when a HS3 codes mapped into, for example, 3 SIC87 codes, we summed the
values of exports of these 3 codes and calculated the percentage accounted for by each code in the group.
Whenever a SIC87 code accounted for more than 75 percent of this value, we assigned the HS3 code to
it. This gives us 88 HS3 codes mapped each into unique CIC codes. The correlation between intra firm
trade and the probability of being assigned a particular code through this method is of -0,02. Finally,
when a HS3 code mapped into SIC87 industries with similar trade values we assume it was imported from
all of them under the same intra firm trade share. The underlying assumption of this procedure is that
the structure of trade in the SESSI dataset is close to the structure of US-France trade (i.e. the SESSI
is a representative survey of bilateral trade, as shown by the INSEE). We experimented with different
thresholds and found similar results. The coefficient of a regression like the one in column (3) of Table
5 run on observations with a clear mapping is -.0154 (with t-stat -6.01), which is higher and even more
significant.
Control variables come from the NBER productivity database website: http://www.nber.org/nberces/n
bprod96.htm. They were downloaded originally in SIC4 codes and aggregated into CIC codes using a con-
cordance table provided by the Census. (h/l)n(us) is the natural log of total capital stock to production
workers. (h/l)n(us) is the ratio of nonproduction to total workers. (VA/shipments)n(us) is the ratio of
value added to total shipments. Ad valorem tariffs imposed by the EU to the US come from the BACI
dataset available at CEPII. Tariffs are at the HS4 level. We aggregate at the HS3 level using imports
from the US in the SESSI dataset as weights. Av specn(us) is the weighted average of the Rauch index,
constructed as the measure Av specn described above. It was aggregated to HS3 using trade flows from the
US in the SESSI dataset as weights. All concordance tables can be found online on Jon Haveman’s website
(http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradeconcordances.html).
Estimating sample: The SESSI survey was answered by 4305 firms (both exporters and importers). Of
these, 4,249 record positive imports. We keep only manufacturing imports (ISIC 15 to 37), which reduces
the number of firms to 4,204. We drop observations that have France as origin country (6,633), leaving
4,177 firms. We finally drop firms whose main industry affiliation is outside manufacturing (mainly retail-
ers) or is in extractive industries (ISIC 23), leaving 3,128 firms. Of these, 26 firms import from countries
with no data on country variables of column (2) of Table 3. Our estimating sample thus contains 3,102
firms.
Accounting for potential sample selection: We use the methodology of Corcos et al. (2013) to ac-
count for selection into the SESSI dataset. In a first stage, a Probit model is run on on the group of firms
belonging to the survey target population, with the dependent variable equal to 1 if firm i responded to
the survey. Explanatory variables are the total value of imports, the number of imported industry codes,
the number of origin countries, and 3-digit buyer industry dummies. The inverse mills ratio calculated
40
from this regression is then used as a regressor in the second stage (see their paper for more details).
Table 10 reports the results of a regression similar to the oone of column (4) in Table 3, but without the
firm dummies. Column (1) has no firm controls. Column (2) includes (log) firm size, (log) labor produc-
tivity. Column (3) adds the inverse Mills (IM) ratio obtained from Corcos et al. (2013). The number of
observations is slightly reduced due to the lack of firm-level data for 70 firms.
Table 10: Corcos et al. (2013) correction
Dependent variable: Share of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3)
Worker bargaining power -0.080** -0.087** -0.078**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
# Clusters 57 57 57
Full set of country-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Seller-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls No size, labor productivity IM, size, labor productivity
Observations 84,394 84,394 84,394
R-squared 0.089 0.090 0.099
Notes: ∗∗, indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
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